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ABSTRACT 
Malingering is a frequently encountered problem of faking psychological or 
physiological symptoms or exaggerating existing conditions for external gain. 
Malingerers typically are seen in clinical and forensic settings and create a burden to our 
society due to loss of economic resources or professional time. The impact of 
malingering is difficult to calculate due to problems with identifying actual cases of 
malingering. Psychological tests traditionally have been used in the assessment of 
malingering. Despite major improvements in instruments and clinical interviewing 
techniques, however, no failsafe assessment tool has been identified for the accurate 
detection of malingering. Cognitive studies of lie detection have provided evidence that 
liars differ from truth-tellers in terms of increased cognitive load that might be measured 
via several cognitive cues. For example, response time is longer for liars compared to 
truth-tellers. Eye gaze and pupil dilation also differ when individuals lie. TRI-Con is a 
new approach (officially introduced by Walczyk, 2005) that uses eye data to monitor, 
record, and compare truthful versus deceptive responses and might be a stepping stone to 
more accurate and objective detection of malingering in the future. The current study was 
designed to reveal differences between truth-tellers and malingerers in terms of response 
time and eye data when confronted with different scenarios that entail telling the truth, 
rehearsed malingering, and unrehearsed malingering. Findings showed that response time 
is a more reliable cue for detecting malingering than eye data. 
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The American Psychological Association (APA, 2007) defines malingering as 
"the deliberate feigning of an illness or disability to achieve a particular desired outcome 
(e.g., financial gain or escaping responsibility, punishment, imprisonment, or military 
duty)" (p. 551). Malingerers may pretend to suffer from physical or psychological 
problems or significantly exaggerate existing symptoms to achieve their goals. Under rare 
circumstances, malingering might constitute an adaptive function such as avoiding 
captivity during war or hostage situations (APA, 2000). In most circumstances, however, 
malingering represents a socially negative event characterized by deceit, fraud, or lying. 
This phenomenon is neither a psychiatric nor a medical disorder; it is categorized as a V-
code in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Edition) Text 
Revision (DSM-IV-TR; APA). The APA suggests that malingering often involves: (a) 
medical and legal issues; (b) objective clinical findings that differ significantly from the 
individual's reported problems; (c) a lack of cooperation during the evaluation process or 
failure to comply with the prescribed treatment; and (d) antisocial personality disorder. 
Malingering might initially be confused with factitious disorder, a psychological 
disorder based on the purposeful fabrication of psychological or physical symptoms. 
Individuals with this diagnosis, however, make up symptoms in order to assume the sick 
role and not for the gain or escape sought by malingerers. There are four subtypes: 
1 
2 
(a) with predominantly psychological signs and symptoms such as depression or 
hallucinations; (b) with predominantly physical signs and symptoms such as pretending 
to suffer from pain; (c) with combined psychological and physical signs and symptoms 
such as grief and headaches after the unconfirmed death of a spouse; and (d) factitious 
disorder not otherwise specified, a subtype that does not meet the criteria for any of the 
other subtypes. Munchhausen Syndrome is considered the most severe and chronic form 
of factitious disorder and often manifests itself in repeated hospitalizations (APA, 2007). 
The motivation differs between malingering and factitious disorder. Whereas people with 
factitious disorder are rewarded by adopting the sick role itself, malingerers are 
motivated by external factors such as financial gain, the avoidance of duties and 
responsibilities, or obtaining treatment or drugs that are not medically justified. The 
hallmark of a diagnosis of malingering is that the symptoms or deficits are intentionally 
created for some type of external gain (APA, 2000). 
Malingering historically has been categorized as a disease by psychoanalytic 
theorists. However, research has not supported its pathogenic nature because of the lack 
of evidence supporting either conscious motivation or unconscious defense mechanisms 
(Lo Piccolo, Goodkin, & Baldewicz, 1999; Resnick, 1999; Singh, Avasthi, & Grover, 
2007). Malingering is not considered a psychological disorder because it involves the 
purposeful deceiving of others for external rewards. It drains society of financial 
resources, falsely engages professional services, and causes a lack of productivity from 
the malingerer. For these reasons, it is not considered a mental disorder in and of itself, 
but rather a deliberate act of faking emotional, physical, or psychological distress in order 
to obtain otherwise inaccessible resources. For example, Lees-Haley (1997) reports a 
20% to 30% base rate for malingering in his United States sample of plaintiffs claiming 
personal injury. The American Board of Clinical Neuropsychologists estimates that 29% 
of the plaintiffs in personal injury cases are malingering (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, 
& Condit, 2002). 
Singh and colleagues (2007) distinguish among various categories of malingering: 
(a) pure; (b) partial; (c) positive; and (d) negative. Producing non-existent symptoms is 
considered pure malingering, whereas exaggeration of already existing indicators is a 
partial form of malingering. For example, a person without psychotic problems who 
claims to experience auditory hallucinations is producing non-existing symptoms (pure 
malingering), whereas a mildly depressed person who reports tremendous distress, 
sadness, hopelessness, and even suicidal ideations would exemplify symptom 
exaggeration (partial malingering). Feigning the signs of a disorder is consistent with the 
positive form of malingering, whereas concealing or misrepresenting signs is the negative 
form. Other types of malingering include the alteration of data and the staging of certain 
situations that later could be interpreted as an accident. For example, an individual might 
alter a physician's health report so that the data portray him as less healthy than he is in 
reality. Another malingerer might plant the proverbial banana peal in a store in order to 
conveniently slip on it, pretend to have been hurt due to the negligence of the store, and 
pursue a legal settlement for financial gain. 
Samuel and Mittenberg (2005) suggest that the following factors indicate the 
presence of malingering: (a) atypical or exaggerated symptoms; (b) inconsistencies in 
symptom description; (c) activities and behaviors that contradict claims; and (d) claims 
that are motivated by and have circumstances other than sickness or disability. These 
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same authors suggest that the following factors are inconsistent with malingering: 
(a) obtaining aggressive treatment such as painful interventions; (b) objective collateral 
corroboration; (c) losses that are significant and obvious to the observer; and 
(d) self-defeating actions and behaviors. Taken together, these two sets of factors are 
important considerations when assessing an individual for malingering. 
Statement of the Problem 
Estimates of the incidence of malingering within the realm of psychology suggest 
that approximately 1% of civilian and 5% of military clients fake mental illness (Singh et 
al., 2007). Singh and colleagues further report rates of malingering personal injury cases 
ranging from 1% to 50%. Combined legal and medical cases suggest rates from 10% to 
20%. According to Mischoulon (1999), psychiatric disability is estimated to cost $12 
billion annually in the U.S., an estimate that has increased significantly over the past 
decade. Various government and privately financed programs have been established for 
providing payments for medical and psychiatric problems or disability, including: 
(a) Emergency Aid; (b) Worker's Compensation; (c) Department of Veterans' Affairs, 
(d) Private Insurance Companies; (e) Social Security Administration; (f) Medicare; and 
(g) Medicaid. All of these organizations are negatively affected by people faking their 
disorders and making illegitimate financial claims. 
Research suggests that all age groups are involved in malingering (Singh et al., 
2007). These disorders range from mental retardation to psychosis. Getting benefits for 
disabilities, claiming unjustified compensations, and retaliating against employers are 
some of the reasons for mental health malingering, according to these authors. 
Malingering creates a variety of problems for the medical, psychiatric, and psychological 
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professions that are challenged with correctly diagnosing the existence of mental and 
physical disease and disorder. Malingering also hurts the economy. Malingerers might 
target the acquisition of one-time financial compensations such as litigation suits, or they 
might seek financial benefits such as those which accompany disability status. Samuel 
and Mittenberg (2005), for example, estimate that 7.5% to 33% of individuals who claim 
disability status are malingerers. 
The legal system is plagued by many types of malingering: in order to avoid 
punishment via an insanity plea; assuming incompetency to stand trial; or introducing 
unjustified litigation and personal injury litigation. This form of deception also burdens 
the correctional system with inmates who fake mental or physical illnesses (Boone, 
Savodnik, Ghafferian, Lee, & Freeman, 1995; Pollack & Grainey, 1984; Rubenzer, 
2004). 
In sum, malingering represents a burden to the medical and psychological 
professions, insurance and disability services, governmental systems that grant financial 
benefits, and to society in general (Pollack & Grainey, 1984). It drains our society of 
limited resources by providing benefits to people who would not receive them if their 
false claims were detectable. 
Justification 
The existence of malingering unfairly draws on resources of those legitimately 
suffering from various disorders. Moreover, some people who are actually ill might avoid 
seeking disability or treatment out of fear of being labeled a malingerer. Traditionally, the 
mental health profession is reluctant to identify malingerers, possibly due to legal 
concerns and also because of the ethical concern of violating confidences protected by 
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the therapeutic relationship (Resnick, 1984). However, increased competition for limited 
resources and general awareness of mental and medical symptoms trigger the need to 
differentiate accurately between real and fraudulent need for services (Singh et al., 2007). 
It is increasingly easy for someone to fake any type of medical or psychological disorder 
with the availability of information from the Internet and other resources. For example, 
concerns have been expressed that attorneys might coach their clients on tests designed to 
detect malingering and this undermines the test's validity (Rogers, 1997; Wetter 
& Corrigan, 1995; Youngjohn, 1995). Clients also look up professional articles about 
disorders in libraries, read professional medical journals, and obtain internet information 
on exact symptomalogy (Rogers, 1997; Wetter & Corrigan, 1995; Youngjohn, 1995). 
Accurate assessments of malingering are needed that can better safeguard the fair 
distribution of resources. The creation of a more reliable system for disability evaluators 
to detect feigned claims would help burdened professionals focus on processing 
legitimate applications more efficiently. 
Literature Review 
Although the importance of accurately identifying malingering seems obvious, the 
precise detection of this form of deception is an ongoing challenge for the medical, 
psychiatric, and psychological professions. It frequently involves significant differences 
between clinical findings and reported symptoms (Cunnien, 1997; Singh et al., 2007). 
Singh and colleagues (2007) suggest taking certain steps in order to increase accuracy of 
the recognition of feigned symptoms. Conducting a thorough clinical history by 
interviewing the patient, asking leading questions in order to test for responses, and 
conducting elaborate cross examinations for suspected malingerers are some of their 
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suggestions for differentiating between feigned and true illness. Observations of the client 
during the interview situation in order to detect verbal, facial, and behavioral cues, and an 
emphasis on continuing observation across time and different settings are additional 
suggestions of theirs. Reliance on observed cues, however, is problematic because of a 
heretofore high rate of misinterpretation of them. 
Settings of Malingering 
Malingerers fake distress, sickness, and injuries with various dishonest goals in 
mind. Two of the main settings in which malingering of physical or psychological 
problems occur are forensic settings and in claims for financial gain such as gaining 
disability status, workers' compensation, or during litigation. For financial damages 
settlement, individuals frequently fake psychological disorders because they are often 
difficult to detect due to the absence of tangible symptoms of such disorders. 
Ziskin (1984) notes that evaluating patients for malingering is approached 
differently from the clinical and forensic perspective. There often is less incentive to 
malinger in the classical clinical setting than in forensic settings where faking symptoms 
or exaggerating existing conditions might constitute a major advantage. Fauteck (1995) 
reports that malingered psychosis is an especially frequent preference of defendants, a 
phenomenon that burdens the court with redundant assessments and costs the forensic 
system valuable time and money. Pollock (1998) interviewed three groups of prison 
inmates, those who were: (a) genuinely psychotic; (b) simulating a psychotic disorder; or 
(c) previously psychotic but currently faking psychosis. Findings from this study revealed 
that both simulators and inmates with a history of psychosis but presently without 
manifest psychiatric problems produced reports with simple and concise descriptions of 
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their malingered symptoms. Members of these groups also reported severe impairments 
due to their mental problems, and their reports appeared distressful and believable. 
Pollock states that challenging the truthfulness of psychosis is problematic for mental 
health professionals because they might be accused of increasing the distress of inmates. 
Despite minimal improvements in clinical interviewing and psychological measurements 
of malingering, the lack of a foolproof method for detecting deception remains a problem 
for the mental health professional in this setting (Fauteck, 1995). 
Not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), guilty but mentally ill (GBMI), and 
incompetency to stand trial are three court rulings that often are pursued by an able 
person who is trying to avoid punishment or change an expected sentence of 
incarceration to psychiatric treatment (Krings, Davison, Neale, & Johnson, 2007). 
Rubenzer (2004) notes that one major concern with malingerers in forensic settings is 
their taking advantage of society's compassion for true mental health patients. Such 
deceptions often produce subsequent distrust toward defendants who are actually 
incompetent or insane. Other problems that malingerers create within this context are the 
enormous financial burden and the drainage of resources such as psychological and 
psychiatric treatments and legal fees. Malingerers in prison often are bored with the 
sterile environment of correctional psychiatric wards, and they require mental health 
services by behaviorally acting out. Rubenzer elaborates on the Supreme Court decision 
to prohibit the execution of mentally retarded inmates. This might constitute an enormous 
incentive, he states, for some criminals to fake cognitive impairments or other mental 
problems. He further states that mental health professionals in forensic settings report 
malingering rates of 16% to 18% by individuals who claim significant impairments. 
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Rubenzer cautions that this range is probably an underestimate, because many 
malingerers are not accurately identified. Whereas many prison inmates malinger, others 
are severely mentally ill, often undiagnosed, and in need of treatment (Teplin, 1990). 
There are major concerns with prisoners who have secondary motivations for 
claiming mental health problems (Resnick, 1997; Rogers, Ustad, & Salekin, 1997). 
Inmates frequently malinger for various gain motives and burden the prison mental health 
system with unjustified claims that complicate diagnosis (Wang, Rogers, Giles, Diamond, 
Herrington-Wang, & Taylor, 1997). For example, a fake diagnosis of mental or medical 
illnesses might have an impact on their work assignments or provide them with 
medications which they can trade for cigarettes or other items. According to the 
American Psychiatric Association (2000), antisocial personality disorder is one major 
DSM diagnosis that is associated with malingering in correctional populations. 
There is no accurate information regarding the rates of malingering for financial 
compensation, only estimates. The difficulty is because objective detection of 
malingering still does not exist (Samuel & Mittenberg, 2005). Sumanti, Boone, Savodnik 
and Gorsuch (2006) observed that approximately 9% to 29% of a sample of workers who 
applied for stress related workers' compensation displayed non-credible psychiatric 
symptoms. More than two decades ago, Marcus (1983) and Lasky (1980) described the 
work-related claims of psychological stress, and this figure has not declined (Sumanti, 
Boone, Savodnik, & Gorsuch, 2006). For example, stress related claims associated with 
employment rose by 700% between 1979 and 1988 and each claim costs an average of 
$12,000 (California Worker's Compensation Institute, 1990). Due to the insidious nature 
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of malingering, the actual extent of financial burden on the economy can only be grossly 
estimated. 
Diagnosing Malingering 
Research over the past three decades has shown the lack of reliable tools for 
detecting deception. According to Vrij (2008), even experts in lie detection such as police 
officers are no more successful than the average individual whose accurate identification 
of liars via observation of behavioral cues ranges from 45% to 60%. A meta-analysis of 
108 studies about detecting deception confirmed this finding, and Aamodt and Custer 
(2006) reported that neither confidence, experience, education, nor sex of examiner was 
significantly related to accurate identification of deception. Even professionals in the 
field of lie detection (e.g., police, detectives, and judges) showed the same ability to 
detect faking as students and other individuals not professionally trained in this field 
(Aamodt & Custer). 
Different explanations exist about the difficulties inherent in lie detection. 
O'Sullivan (2003) focused on examiners' thought processes which impact their ability to 
identify liars correctly. For example, cognitive heuristics, especially the fundamental 
attribution error (FAE), might provide an explanation for this human fallability. The FAE 
represents people's tendency to overestimate the relevance of personal traits such as 
aggressiveness or attentiveness when they form opinions of others (Ross & Nisbett, 
1991). O'Sullivan found that individuals with better lie detection abilities are better able 
to separate their judgments of state and trait honesty compared to people without good 
lie-detection abilities. Trait judgments are opinions formed about another individual's 
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personality characteristics or traits, whereas state judgments involve looking at the 
context in which a behavior takes place. 
Other explanations for the inability to accurately identify liars include the 
following: problems with attending sufficiently to non-verbal behaviors when judging the 
veracity of others' statements (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, & Scherer, 1980; Ekman, 
O'Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991); more orientation to speech content instead of 
observing paralinguistic cues (DePaulo, Rosenthal, Rosenkrantz, & Green, 1982; 
O'Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1985); a tendency to judge others as truthful or 
deceptive (O'Sullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988; Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, 
& Rosenthal, 1979; Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984); and having incorrect 
schematas about cues to deception. Deceptive cues include the belief that people who 
avoid eye gazes are lying, whereas research indicates that liars increase eye gaze during 
deception due to their awareness of this paradigm (Zuckerman & Driver, 1985; Ekman 
& Friesen, 1969). Deviations from physical, personality, cultural, and behavioral norms 
are frequently interpreted as cues to deception. For example, people who have awkward 
physical characteristics or who display mannerisms which are outside of what is 
considered normal within one's culture are frequently viewed as suspicious, and their 
truthfulness is questioned (Bond, Omar, Mahmoud, & Bonser, 1990; Bond, Omar, Pitre, 
& Lashley, 1992; Ekman, 2001; Riggio, Salinas, & Tucker, 1988; Zebrowitz, Voinescu, 
& Collins, 1996). 
There are no known mechanisms for identifying liars and malingerers by merely 
observing behaviors. Therefore, more reliable measures are necessary in order to improve 
the detection of deception in general and malingering in particular. 
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Psychological Tests 
Psychological tests traditionally have been used for detecting malingering. 
Although no failsafe instrument has been identified at this time, the inclusion of testing 
has been considered a valuable adjunct methodology in detecting malingering. Research 
on detecting malingering via psychological measures has shown that testing has produced 
both false positives and false negatives. The American Psychological Association (2007) 
defines false positives as "a case that is incorrectly included in a group by the test used to 
determine inclusion" (p. 366) and false negatives as "a case that is incorrectly excluded 
from the group by the test used to determine inclusion" (p. 366). In the case of a 
malingering diagnosis, a false positive would consist of incorrectly labeling a sick 
individual as a malingerer. Incorrectly labeling a person faking symptoms as being 
"sick," on the other hand, would comprise a false negative. Increased public knowledge 
of psychological and medical symptomology supports more sophisticated ways of faking 
and also coaching for malingering, and both of these have made correct detection and 
malingering increasingly difficult (Leng & Parkin, 1995; Singh et al., 2007). 
Psychological instruments that are commonly used for detecting malingering are 
reviewed below. 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) is 567-item 
personality measure frequently is used to assess clinical psychopathology, including 
clients' testing attitude and their attempts to exaggerate symptoms and was originally 
developed by Hathaway and McKinley (1940). The MMPI-2 is the most frequently used 
test for the assessment of psychopathology, especially for evaluations within the context 
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of forensic examinations and the review of disability claims (Bagby, Marshall, 
& Bacchiochi, 2005). Besides the clinical scales and subscales, the ten validity scales of 
the MMPI-2 play a significant role in its popularity within these contexts. These ten 
scales are a sophisticated way to measure whether or not a test profile is valid. Invalid 
test profiles might be produced by random answering and/or poor reading abilities of 
examinees. The validity scales also provide indications of test-taker motivation, for 
example, the tendency to conceal, disclose, or emphasize problems (Groth-Marnat, 
2003). The F-scales (F, F-Back, and Infrequency-Psychopathology) are called the 
malingering scales because they measure the presence of symptoms that are indicative of 
severe psychiatric illness. 
Friedman, Lewak, Nicols, and Webb (2001) note that the F-scale of the MMPI-2 
is intended to assess examinees' tendencies to respond to the 60 test items which 
comprise the F-Scale in an uncommon manner. For example, individuals who do not 
understand the questions might obtain high scores on this scale. The same high scores, 
however, might be achieved by someone with situational distress who has poor reading 
comprehension of the items, who experiences genuine psychological problems, or who 
tries to exaggerate or fake problems. This scale represents one of the most sensitive 
scales of the MMPI-2 for suggesting severity of distress. 
The F-Back scale (FB) was designed for a similar purpose. Its items fall in the last 
half of the MMPI-2. Whereas the F-scale is designed to detect psychoticism, the FB scale 
is designed mainly to detect distress and depression. This subscale is also important in the 
detection of random responding and malingering (Wetter, Baer, Berry, Smith, & Larsen, 
1992). Wetter and collegues found that the FB scale is effective in detecting random 
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responding and also the feigning of mild, moderate, and severe disturbance. Malingering 
severe psychopathology produces the highest scores on the FB scale. Clinicians are 
encouraged to interpret high scores on this scale with caution, however, because there are 
other explanations for high scores such as fatigue or uncooperativeness. 
The Infrequency-Psychopathology (Fp) scale was created to assess the tendency to 
over-report symptoms or to portray oneself in an unfavorable light. This subscale is 
sensitive to the exaggeration of problems, especially the exaggeration of psychotic 
symptoms. Combined with the use of all three F-scales, good clinical judgment is the 
critical component needed to assess malingering (Friedman et al., 2001). 
An important constellation of the MMPI-2 validity scales frequently is used for 
detecting malingering. An inverted "V" constellation of the validity scales (low Lie [L]) 
scale, high F-scale, and low Correction scale) suggest that the test taker attempted to fake 
mental illness (Singh et al., 2007). Friedman and colleagues (2001) describe the L-scale 
as a 15-item subscale designed to detect underreporting of symptoms, e.g., "faking 
good." For example, child custody cases or employment testing are settings in which 
individuals may be prone to portray themselves in a favorable light. All 15 items may be 
scored in the false direction in these cases. For example, "I do not always tell the truth" 
or "I get angry sometimes" are two examples of questions that assess "faking good." The 
values portrayed by these two items might be highly desirable for the majority of 
individuals, but they rarely are achieved, and a "true" endorsement is the most truthful 
answer for most people. Caution in interpretation is warranted, however, because this 
scale is affected by moderator variables such as socio-economic status, education, and 
occupation. 
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The Correction (K) scale originally was intended to improve the sensitivity of the 
clinical subscales in identifying psychological problems. It adds a correction or 
suppressor element to the obtained scaled scores on the clinical scales. The purpose of 
this factor is to decrease false positives or low scores endorsed by psychiatric populations 
who would be expected to achieve elevations on certain clinical scales. Several issues 
must be considered before interpreting K-scale scores. For example, certain personality 
traits are closely related to the willingness to report and admit to shortcomings and 
problems. In these instances, an incorrect diagnosis of malingering (false positive) might 
occur. Clearly, scores on all of these validity scales are ambiguous at best for uncovering 
malingering. 
In a meta-analysis of studies designed to detect malingering with the MMPI-2, 
Rogers, Sewell, Martin, and Vitacco (2003) found that research participants who were 
instructed to feign mental illness scored significantly differently from actual psychiatric 
patients on the F, FB, and F-Infrequency-Psychopathology (Fp) scales. The analysis 
produced large between-group effect sizes which suggested that the validity scales 
discussed above provide a valuable tool for detecting feigned mental illness. However, 
Friedman and colleagues (2001) caution that whereas the L and F scales display adequate 
properties in the detection of extreme test-taking attitudes or misrepresentations, they 
show a lower level of precision with subtle levels of defensiveness and underreporting of 
difficulties. 
The MMPI-2 is, thus, not failsafe for the accurate detection of malingering. 
Elevated F-scales do not automatically indicate a motivation to deceive, because they 
may indicate the presence of clinical depression in psychiatric populations (Steffan, 
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Clopton, & Morgan, 2003). Due to the high prevalence of depression in the population 
- a lifetime risk ranging from 5 % to 25 % depending on sex (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) - the inability to differentiate between depression and faking 
depression is problematic for clinical practice. Therefore, Steffan and colleagues (2003) 
created the Malingering Depression Scale (Md) on the MMPI-2 to identify malingerer 
depression. It consists of 32 items that appear to increase valid differentiation of 
malingering by sophisticated feigners and by naive feigners from actual depressed 
students (Bagby, Marshall, & Bacchiochi, 2005; Steffan et al., 2003). 
Personality Assessment Inventory 
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991) is another personality 
inventory used to measure adult psychopathology that has application in the detection of 
malingering (Sumanti et al., 2006; Wang et al., 1997). This instrument consists of 344 
test items that are scored on a 4-point Likert scale. The purpose of the PAI is to screen for 
mental health problems and to facilitate clinical diagnosis and treatment planning 
(Morey, 1991). The negative impression management (NIM) and malingering index (MI) 
scales on this instrument typically are used to identify malingerers. The NIM scale is a 
validity scale that can detect the feigning of specific disorders (Calhoun, Earnst, Tucker, 
Kirby, & Beckham, 2000). Hopwood, Morey, Rogers, and Sewell (2007) report that 
individuals who display specific distortions on the NIM and on certain clinical subscales 
on the PAI are more likely to feign major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, or schizophrenia. Calhoun and colleagues (2000) report less efficacy of these 
scales to identify feigned depression, with a hit rate of 55.9%, and generalized anxiety 
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disorder, with a hit rate of 38.7%. They report that malingered schizophrenia was 
detected in 90.9% of the researched cases. 
Sumanti and colleagues (2006) found low levels of correct identification of 
malingerers with the two PAI validity scales (MIN and MAL). When scores on these 
scales are correlated with scores on other cognitive measures such as the Dot Counting 
test and Rey test, the correlations were exceedingly low, ranging from non-existent to 
moderate. This suggests a weak relationship between symptoms for psychiatric 
malingering and cognitive effort tests, and it confirms findings from earlier studies that 
psychiatric malingering is independent from faking cognitive impairment (Boone, 
Savodnik, Ghaffarian, Lee, & Freeman, 1995, as cited in Sumanti et al., 2006). Liljequist, 
Kinder, and Schinka (1998) showed that in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
simulation studies, undergraduate students in the malingering experimental condition 
scored higher than participant ts it the control condition on the NIM and malingering 
index (MI). Therefore, the PAI seems to be effective in identifying PTSD in simulation 
research. Whereas the NIM scale is highly effective in detecting PTSD malingering in 
instructed simulation, it appears to misclassify individuals who actually suffer from 
PTSD. In other words, it yields false positives. Scores of PTSD sufferers on this scale 
suggest that they significantly over-report their symptoms, and for this reason, 13% to 
26% of individuals with PTSD could be classified as malingerers (Calhoun et al., 2000). 
Morey (1991) found a correlation of .54 between the MMPI-2's F-Scale and the 
PAI's NIM scale. Calhoun and colleagues (2000) caution therapists to consider the 
setting when assessing the probability of making a Type I or Type II error regarding 
diagnosis of PTSD with the PAI validity indexes. A Type I or alpha error occurs when 
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researchers reject a null Hypothesis that is true, whereas a Type II or beta error occurs 
when a false null Hypotheses is not rejected (American Psychological Association, 
2007). Whereas liberal criteria for PTSD may be better suited for settings which provide 
critical treatments, more stringent criteria should be applied to court settings. For this 
reason, a NEM score greater than 8 is suggested in forensic settings. 
Another important aspect of deception research is the impact of coaching. Bagby, 
Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder, and Bury (2002) found that coaching did not increase 
effectiveness in malingering when research participants were assessed with the MMPI-2 
and the PAL This means that coaching malingerers on the symptomology of their 
reported disorders does not make them better fakers when assessed by the MMPI-2 and 
PAL Guriel-Tennant and Fremouw (2006) report that coached participants in a PTSD 
study had lower group means than uncoached malingerers on the NIM and MI scales of 
the PAL No significant difference was noted between detection of malingerers in each 
group. 
Research in which participants simulated suffering from symptoms of 
schizophrenia, major depression, or generalized anxiety disorder revealed findings that 
the PAI's effectiveness in detecting malingering depends on the level of sophistication of 
the malingerer. Specifically, Rogers, Sewell, Morey, and Ustad (1996) found that the PAI 
is moderately effective in detecting unrehearsed simulators and also moderately effective 
in identifying rehearsed simulators. This suggests that extensive preparation in studying 
symptoms of psychotic, mood, or anxiety disorders can help malingerers to escape 
detection when tested with the PAI. 
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Rorschach Inkblot Test 
The Rorschach is a projective test consisting of a set of cards with ten bilaterally 
symmetrical black-and-white or colored inkblots. Its original version was developed in 
1921 by Swiss psychiatrist, Hermann Rorschach (Rorschach, 1964). The test format was 
based on the assumption that individuals have specific needs, motivations, conflicts, and 
individualistic ways of perceiving their environment (Groth-Marnat, 2003). The 
examinee is asked "What might this be?" or "What do you see in this?" when presented 
with each card (p. 808). Response content of responses is classified according to different 
structural and thematic elements such as color and movement (APA, 2007). Although 
frequently criticized, the Rorschach appears to maintain its status in the psychological 
profession as evidenced by the multitude of publications, books, and ongoing research 
involving this test (Archer & Newsom, 2000; Camara, Nathan, & Puente, 2000; Exner, 
1997). Interpretation of the Rorschach is based on the assumption that the way people 
organize their responses during the test is representative of their dealings with ambiguous 
situations that also demand organization and judgment (Groth-Marnat, 2003). Therefore, 
this test is believed to provide insight into unconscious motivations and attitudes. 
Another application of the Rorschach is in the detection of malingering. In testing 
the ability to fake psychosis on the Rorschach test, Ganellen, Wasyliw, Haywood, and 
Grossman (1996) found that the combination of Rorschach and MMPI-2 provide 
effective criteria for identifying deliberate faking of psychosis. However, other research 
findings regarding the Rorschach are problematic if the researcher fails to use a formal 
scoring system (Albert, Fox, & Kahn, 1980, as cited in Ganellen et al., 1996) such as 
Exner's Rorschach Comprehensive System (1991). 
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In another study of the detection of malingering, Meisner (1988) studied the 
impact of faked depression on scores from the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the 
MMPI Depression Scale, and the Rorschach. The undergraduate student participants were 
instructed to feel depressed, informed about the symptoms of depression, and offered a 
$50 cash reward for the most convincing malingering on the assessment. The findings 
suggest that malingered depression can be identified by the Rorschach Morbid Special 
(MSS) and Blood (Bl) scores for example. Interestingly, Intelligence did not have an 
effect on participants' ability to alter their responses. Meisner suggests that atypical 
frequencies in response determinants should not serve as evidence for malingering. 
Furthermore, Meisner (1988) found that the content indicators of depression on the 
Rorschach are influenced by examinees' impression management strategies, e.g., their 
motivation to appear depressed. Whereas in Meisner's research such motivation was 
demonstrated by participants who had been coached about symptoms of depression, other 
studies revealed that uncoached participants displayed similar scores (Feldman & Graley, 
1954; Seamons, Howell, Carlisle, & Roe, 1981). 
Rey Memory Test (RMT) and Rey II 
The Rey Memory Test (Rey, 1964) is a brief, 15-item instrument created for the 
detection of memory impairment. The original test was developed by the French 
neurologist, Andre Rey, as an assessment of memory impairments. The 15 items are 
arrayed in three columns and five rows on a card. The items include simple geometric 
designs or single-digit numbers. The test taker must reproduce these items after the card 
has been shown for 10 seconds and is then removed (Griffin, Glassmire, Aubrey, 
Henderson, & McCann, 1997). In order for memory tests to work in the detection of 
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malingering, the malingerer must perceive the test as difficult for people with cognitive 
impairments. This will trigger the individual's tendency to underperform (Bolan, Foster, 
Schmand, & Bolan, 2002). 
Simon (1994) found in forensic clinical settings that the Rey Memory Test can 
effectively discriminate between malingerers and controls. However, the cut-off score 
appears to be a crucial component when assessing for malingering. Whereas a low cut-off 
score of 3 items remembered results in a false positive rate of 57% in the control group, a 
cut-off score of 9 creates an improved differentiation between malingerers and 
non-malingerers. The cut-off score appears to be an important component in detecting 
memory malingering, but researchers vary in their determination of an appropriate one. 
Most frequently a score of 8 or 9 is suggested for improved accuracy (Bernard & Fowler, 
1990; Goldberg & Millar, 1986; Kelly, Baker, van den Broek, Jackson & Humphries, 
2005). Five case studies by Taylor, Kreutzer, and West (2003) with the Rey 15-item Test 
(FIT) and other standardized neurobehavioral and neuropsychological measures with 
outpatients showed that severely brain-damaged individuals obtained perfect scores on 
the FIT. The authors, therefore, support the use of high cut-off scores for identifying 
malingering. Malingerers score significantly lower than individuals with severe cognitive 
impairments. 
The Rey II is a redesign of the original Rey 15-item Visual Memory Test (1964), 
and it demonstrates a significant improvement in the detection of malingering. The 
format of the Rey II is similar to the original Rey (three columns and five rows of simple 
items), but some of the items have been altered so that its difficulty level is slightly 
increased (Griffin et al., 1997). The instrument uses a qualitative scoring system with 
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improved effectiveness for detecting malingering over the quantitative system of its 
predecessor. Whereas the quantitative scoring system exhibited average sensitivity 
(ability to identify malingerers with 39% accuracy) and average specificity (ability to 
identify optimal performers with 73% accuracy), the qualitative system has an average 
sensitivity of 73% and specificity of 86%. Examining the nature of the qualitative errors 
helps to improve the detection of malingering over the original version of the Rey 
(Griffin et al., 1997). 
Further research on malingering with the Rey AVLT used the serial position 
effect (SPE) for distinguishing between uncoached malingerers, coached malingerers, 
and individuals with actual illness (Powell, Geller, Oliveri, Stanton, & Hendricks, 2004). 
The American Psychological Association (2007) defines the SPE as "the effect of an 
item's position in a list of items to be learned on how well it is remembered" (p. 841). 
Individuals are more likely to remember the first items (the primacy effect) and the last 
items (the recency effect), whereas items in the middle of the list are more likely to be 
forgotten. Powell and colleagues divided research participants into four groups: 
(a) normal controls; (b) simulators who were coached on symptoms; (c) simulators who 
were coached on taking the test; and (d) individuals with actual moderate to severe 
subacute traumatic brain injury (TBI). Whereas the normal control group and the actual 
TBI patients demonstrated the expected SPE, the simulators suppressed the primacy 
effect. Unfortunately, the SPE does not seem to be sensitive or specific enough by itself 
to be used in the detection of malingering. Other assessments are necessary to create a 
more valid differentiation between malingerers and truth-tellers. Individuals with 
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sophisticated styles of exaggeration appear to be especially able to challenge Rey AVLT 
and its method of assessment. 
Boone and colleagues (1995) correlated scores on brief cognitive instruments with 
personality measures, e.g., Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI; Millon, 1996). 
Individuals with failing scores on cognitive malingering tests, such as the Rey 
Memorization and Dot Counting, obtained scores on personality inventories that 
suggested personality disorders and psychotic features. The group who scored poorly on 
the cognitive measures displayed elevated scores on personality test scales that indicated 
avoidance, dependence, passive-aggressiveness, anxiety, somatoform disorder, and 
dysthymia. These results might be interpreted either as showing a relationship between 
certain personality traits and cognitive malingering performance, or as showing an 
artificial elevation due to exaggeration or feigning of psychological problems. Additional 
analyses compared two groups of participants who failed the cognitive malingering 
instruments: one group had valid, non-exaggerated scores on the MCMI whereas the 
other group displayed faked/exaggerated scores. This difference indicated that the second 
interpretation is feigning or exaggeration problems (Boone, et al., 1995). 
Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) 
In many ways, American society rewards sickness by providing resources to the 
ill such as disability payments, but then withdraw support such as financial aid when the 
previously sick individuals improve. Therefore, multiple incentives exist for pretending 
to be sick. Constantitiou and McCaffrey (2003) observed that, mental health 
professionals express concerns about the low level of motivation and effort when clients 
take a neuropsychological test. Neuropsychologists have worked on developing 
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assessments to detect suboptimal efforts so that invalid test scores and incorrect 
diagnoses can be reduced. The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) 
is a frequently used test, because it is designed to identify less than optimal performance 
due to low motivation or lack of effort on neuropsychological tests. The test contains 50 
line-drawn stimulus pictures and foil pictures. Two trials typically are run with pictures 
shown out of sequence on the second trial. Constantitiou and McCaffrey found that the 
TOMM is more effective than the Rey 15-item test at identifying children who put forth 
suboptimal efforts during neuropsychological evaluations. Adequate sensitivity and 
specificity also was noted in samples of adult TBI patients and individuals who were 
seeking compensation for mild head traumas (Haber & Fichtenberg, 2006). 
O'Bryant, Engel, Kleiner, Vasterling, and Black (2007) identify Trial 1 of the 
TOMM as a brief screening instrument with high diagnostic accuracy when assessing 
clients demonstrating suboptimal effort. However, the researchers also suggest that 
additional studies are needed to assess application within clinical and forensic contexts. 
O'Bryant and Lucas (2006) found that the TOMM is not highly sensitive but very 
specific when identifying malingerers. Test sensitivity refers to the proportion of 
individuals with a certain condition that will be identified by the instrument, also known 
as "true positives." Specificity describes the proportion of people without the condition 
who are identified correctly by the measurement, also known as "true negatives." This 
means that the TOMM is more effective in identifying people who do not have the 
condition. The test was found to have a very high positive predictive value of .98 and a 
satisfying negative predictive value of .78. These findings make the test a valuable tool in 
the detection of faking memory problems. One limitation of this study was the use of 
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only one other memory test (Word Memory Test) for establishing reliability and validity 
of the TOMM. O'Bryant and Lucas (2006) caution that multiple methods for assessing 
malingering are essential for correctly identifying it. 
Bolan, Foster, Schmand, and Bolan (2002) found that response latency is an 
important indicator for identifying malingerers on neuropsychological instruments such 
as the Amsterdam Short Memory Test (ASTM; Schagen, Schmand, de Sterke, 
& Lindeboom, 1997) and the TOMM. Simulated malingerers display significantly higher 
response times on these instruments compared to truth-tellers. This supports the value of 
using response time when developing methods for detecting malingering. 
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms 
The Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Gillis, Dickens, 
& Bagby, 1991) consists of 172 items which are answered in a true-false format. It is 
designed to measure deliberate distortions of psychological functioning (Heinze, 2003) 
and is one of the few direct measures of malingering. The SIRS has eight primary scales, 
three of which measure the frequency of symptom endorsement: (a) Blatant Symptoms 
Scale (BL), (b) Subtle Symptoms Scale (SU), and (c) Selectivity of Symptoms Scale 
(SEL). An individual's tendency to endorse unusual symptoms is assessed by the 
following four scales: (a) Rare Symptom Scale (RS), (b) Improbable and Absurd 
Symptoms Scale (IA), (c) Atypical Symptom Combinations Scale (SC), and (d) Extreme 
Severity of Symptoms Scale (SEV). Additionally, the Reported vs. Observed Symptoms 
Scales (RO) assess to what extent symptoms are endorsed during the interview process. 
Moderate elevations suggest possible feigning, whereas marked elevations indicate 
definite malingering (Heinze, 2003). 
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Heinze (2003) reported that the SIRS was effective in detecting malingering of 
psychosis. Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, and Munizza (2007) also examined its effectiveness 
in detecting faked mental illness, and they identified the SIRS as a robust instrument for 
assessment of forensic competency to stand trial. 
In summary, the tests reviewed above are some of the more frequently used 
instruments for uncovering malingering. However, a large number of unreviewed tests 
exist that are used in forensic and clinical settings and also in research. Lally (2003) 
recognizes the difficulty of finding acceptable tests for conducting forensic evaluations 
when malingering is a concern. The six assessment areas of forensic practice are: 
(a) mental state at the offense; (b) risk for violence; (c) risk for sexual violence; 
(d) competency to stand trial; (e) competency to waive Miranda rights; and 
(f) malingering. Forensic experts were surveyed regarding forensic evaluations of 
malingering and they gave acceptable ratings to the SIRS, TOMM, Validity Indicator 
Profile, Rey 15-item Visual Memory Test, MMPI-2, PAI, WAIS-III, and Halstead-Reitan 
(Lally, 2003). The MCMI-II and MCMI-III had mixed acceptability ratings. No opinion 
about acceptability was voiced about the WAS I, KBIT, Luria-Nebraska, and Stanford-
Binet-Revised. These experts criticized the Rorschach, 16 PF, projective drawings, 
sentence completion, and TAT as unacceptable assessment tools for detecting 
malingering. Heinze (2003) supported the use of the MMPI-2, SIRS, M Test, the 
Atypical Presentation Scale, and the Rey 15-item Memory Test as instruments for 
detecting faked psychosis. 
Psychological tests have significant shortcomings for detecting malingering and 
misinterpretations are frequent. Grillo, Brown, Hilsabeck, Price, and Lees-Haley (1994) 
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found with personal injury claimants that elevated scores on the MCMI-II were directly 
related to faking bad. Individuals with indications for Histrionic, Compulsive, Schizoid, 
Schizotypal, Paranoid, Borderline, Antisocial, Avoidant, and Passive-Aggressive 
Personality Disorder were more likely to obtain higher scores on the MMPI-2 validity 
indicators for malingering. These findings suggest that certain personality traits are more 
likely to result in exaggerated symptoms instead of intentional malingering. 
Although there appears to be a variety of psychological tests that are fairly 
effective in detecting malingering, none of them is totally failsafe. Kelly, Baker, van den 
Broek, Jackson, and Humphries (2005) point out that there is no 'gold standard' for 
detecting malingering. Ethical difficulties also play an important role in malingering 
research. Although a real-life sample of malingerers would provide more accurate and 
generalizable data, recruiting patients who are actively pursuing compensation for 
psychological or physical problems poses ethical dilemmas. Whereas simulation studies 
are less ethically sensitive, data obtained from a person pretending to malinger may differ 
substantially from that obtained from a person who is actually malingering and motivated 
to succeed. Other difficulties with attributing certain scores on psychological tests to 
malingering is the possibility of individuals' feigning or exaggerating cognitive problems 
due to personality disorders without being consciously aware of it (Boone et al., 1995; 
Orsini, Van Gorp & Boone, 1988). A major problem in using the MMPI-2 and other 
psychological instruments is their inability to detect malingering with regard to specific 
symptoms such as back pain. A method of lie detection designed to uncover malingering 
at the level of answers to specific questions would be beneficial. 
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Psychiatrists are able to detect approximately 50% of the deception that occurs 
during unstructured interviews, and this only equals chance discovery (Rosen, Mulsant, 
Bruce, Mittal, & Fox, 2004; American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 2004, as 
cited in Samuel and Mittenberg, 2005). According to Samuel and Mittenberg, clinicians 
are unable to distinguish between truthful, faked, or exaggerated problems based on 
demeanor of the client. Because of the varying levels of reliability of most tests, their 
high degree of subjectivity, and their dependence on clinical experience and professional 
judgment for accurate interpretations, other more objective methods of detecting 
malingering must be considered and/or devised. 
Cognitive Measures for the Detection of Malingering 
Cognitive measures have received some attention in the field of lie detection and 
might be useful in the identification of malingering. According to Zuckerman, DePaulo 
and Rosenthal (1981), deception places more cognitive demands on individuals than 
truth-telling. In order to make lies believable, individuals must focus on internal 
coherence, consistency across time, and plausibility in their fabrications. Gombos (2006) 
states that effortful cognitive processes such as inhibition, working memory, and other 
mental management mechanisms represent essential cognitive elements for lie production 
as evidenced by research about lie detection, developmental studies about children and 
deception, and imaging studies that describe neural correlates of deception. 
Other cognitive cues to lie detection are an increase in pupil dilation and response 
latency (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Walczyk and colleagues (2005) hypothesize that 
increased understanding about the cognitive processes used during lying might reveal 
more clues to detect lies. Neurological studies focus on detecting liars via brain scanning. 
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Phan and colleagues (2005) studied the neural correlates of lying by using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Findings suggest that intentional lying relies on 
complex cognitive mechanisms which increase neural activity in the discrete anterior 
frontal regions (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulated cortex). These data are consistent with 
increased brain activity and a larger cognitive load during deception. Back and 
Oppenheim (2001) explain that cognitive load represents the information processing 
efforts of individuals when faced with tasks, e.g., visual stimuli. The American 
Psychological Association (2007) defines cognitive load as "the relative demand imposed 
by a particular task, in terms of mental resources required" (p. 189). Cognitive load is 
also known as mental load or mental workload (American Psychological Association). 
Spence (2008) argues, however, that this science is still in its early stages and 
further data is needed. For example, he reports that 16 peer-reviewed fMRI studies have 
shown increases in neural activity in prefrontal regions during lying when compared to 
truth-telling. However, most of these studies did not succeed in identifying specific brain 
areas that were activated by truthfulness. Spence cautions researchers to focus on 
improving reliability before applying fMRI assessments to the detection of malingering. 
Vrij, Fisher, Mann, and Leal (2006) suggest that the increase in cognitive load 
during lying could provide a new measure of detecting deception. They discuss that 
learning to attend to signs indicating increased cognitive demands might improve the 
ability to detect deception. 
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Response Time 
Response time has been used as an indicator of lying. It represents the time lapse 
between the end of the question asked by the examiner and the beginning of the answer 
of the participant. Research suggests that people with well-integrated schemata in their 
memory will provide faster responses (Walczyk et al., 2005). A cognitive schemata is 
defined as "a collection of basic knowledge about a concept or entity that serves as a 
guide to perception, interpretation, imagination, or problem solving" (American 
Psychological Association, 2007, p. 815). For example, when reading, a person relies on 
previously obtained knowledge and general experiences which aids in comprehension of 
the material. A schemata is the organized knowledge structure that can be accessed 
during the reading process. Individuals typically utilize their schemata when they relate 
new materials to already memorized information. Having access to rich schemata will 
increase comprehension of the new material (Alvarez & Risko, 1989). 
Vendemia, Buzan and Green (2005) conducted a longitudinal study in which they 
examined response time for unrehearsed and rehearsed deception. Findings indicate that 
lying creates longer response time than truth-telling, even for individuals who have been 
practicing the deception. 
Within the context of employment, Holden, Kroner, Fekken, and Popham (1992) 
found that honest job applicants compare their answers to their existing self-schemata 
such as providing personal information about their work habits. Dishonest applicants who 
try to obtain a job for which they are not well-qualified become impression managers, 
and they respond more slowly to questions to which they are lying in order to make a 
positive but untrue impression. 
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Baker, Stern and Goldstein (1990) compared response latencies between 
participants who were asked to respond to questions either with the truth or with a lie. 
Liars displayed a significantly longer time span between the end of questions and the 
beginning of the responses. This supports the notion that it takes more effort to gain 
access to fabricated material than to truthful schematas. 
Brain-imaging techniques support the conclusion that lying is more time-
consuming than truth-telling. As previously discussed, Spence et al., (2001) found that 
lying produces increased neural activation of the bilateral and ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortices when brain imaging was performed with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). 
Participants in a study involving mock crimes showed an increase in response 
times whenever they were presented information pertaining to a mock crime, but they 
responded at a their normal speed to unrelated information (Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & 
Mosmann, 2000). When participants were asked about what concealed knowledge they 
had of the mock the crime, response time measures were more accurate than 
physiological indicators in predicting faked responses. Walczyk and colleagues (2005) 
confirmed that response time differs significantly between truth-tellers and liars. The 
researchers also found that social skills function as a moderator variable. For example, 
people who possess very good social skills were the fastest responders within the lying 
group. 
Pupil Dilation 
Thousands of years ago, people already believed that eyes provided information 
about a person's inner thoughts and emotions, a notion that is confirmed by modern 
32 
studies. Deception impacts pupil dilation. Increases in cognitive load are reflected in 
increases in pupil dilation (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). The increase in more 
complex thinking strategies often employed during deceptive schemes also is related to 
increased pupil dilation. Therefore, dilation provides an objective mechanism for 
measuring a person's deception, or at least it may constitute a useful converging cue to 
deception. 
According to Beatty (1982), eyes are reflective of individuals' cognitive load. 
Kimberley and collegues (2008) describe cognitive load as the extent to which cortical 
resources are utilized in order to manage thought processes. For example, a large 
cognitive load indicates that large amounts of information necessary in order to perform a 
task. Specifically, pupil dilation is indicative of increased efforts in cognitive processes 
(Van Gerven, Paas, Van Merrienboer, & Schmidt, 2004). In digit span recall, pupil size 
becomes larger with increasingly demanding tasks such as adding digits (Granholm, 
Asarnow, Sarkin, & Dykes, 1996). Beatty and Lucero-Wagoner (2000) consider the 
task-evoked pupillary response as indicative of a response to certain cognitive processes 
such as trying to retrieve something from memory, thinking about a difficult subject, or 
pausing during a complicated speech. 
Ahern and Beatty (1979) found that individuals who were assigned to perform 
mental arithmetic showed enlarged pupils whenever the difficulty level was increased. In 
an earlier study, Wright and Kahneman (1971) found that increasing difficulty of verbal 
comprehension tasks also was reflected in an increase in pupil size. These data indicate 
the possibility that pupil dilation may be a cue to malingering. 
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Eye Gaze 
Other indicators of cognitive load that could provide important information for 
the detection of malingering include eye movements, gaze aversion, and eye fixation. For 
example, research provides evidence for socially triggered gaze aversion when 
individuals are involved in difficult cognitive processes. Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, 
Bonner, Longotham, and Doyle (2002) and Glenberg, Schroeder, and Robertson (1998) 
reported an increase in individuals looking away while answering cognitively demanding 
questions during communication with others. People appear to have a tendency to avoid 
visual stimulation when cognitive demands increase, perhaps to minimize external 
distraction. Different theories are proposed to explain gaze aversion such as decreasing 
negative feelings within the context of a negative social-emotional situation, feeling self-
conscious due to one's previous history of misconduct and deception, and an attempt to 
organize the cognitive load that is associated with processing environmental information 
(Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005). However, as previously discussed, liars are 
frequently aware of this paradigm and make a conscious effort to increase eye gaze 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969). 
Intentional deception such as malingering seems to have an effect on certain 
physiological responses that are not easily controlled by the individual and, therefore, 
appear to be more objective measures for the detection of malingering than the 
traditionally used techniques such as psychological assessment. Providing false responses 
may increase the cognitive load which impacts certain cognitive cues such as response 
time (Baker et al., 1990; Holden et al., 1992). Having to fabricate non-existing 
information instead of accessing already existing mental schematas of truthful 
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information increase the time needed to provide a deceitful response, and this makes 
liars, rehearsed or unrehearsed, slower than those accessing the truth and divulging the 
truth (Vendemia et al., 2005). 
Processing demands are associated with a decrease in spontaneous eye 
movements such as blinking and an increase in fixation (Bagley & Manelis, 1979; May, 
Kennedy, Williams, Dunlap, & Brannan, 1990; Underwood, Jebbett, & Roberts, 2004). 
Baker and colleagues (1990) found that individuals who received the contradictory 
instructions to lie to themselves, while at the same time providing truthful answers, 
displayed fewer eye movements and increased response time compared to truth-tellers. 
Therefore, eye data appears to be a viable, objective, and measurable detection of 
deception. 
Rehearsal of Lies 
Previous research has shown that rehearsed lying differs from unrehearsed lying 
in terms of response time, because the liar must prepare and practice feasible but untrue 
lies (Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). Liars who rehearse 
beforehand make decisions to lie in advance and prepare fabrications which shorten 
response times. Participants who have practiced a certain answer in response to a 
particular question show slower responses when the same question is paraphrased 
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Harris, 2003). 
Time-Restricted Integrity Confirmation (TRI-Con) 
A new cognitive method of lie detection based on response time is called TRI-
Con. This approach is based on the Activation-Decision-Construction Model (ADCM) of 
lying, and this cognitive measure has been shown to be an effective method of lie 
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detection and perhaps malingering (Walczyk, Roper, Seeman & Humphreys, 2003; 
Walczyk et al., 2005). In the ADCM, there is a distinction between questions requiring a 
"yes" or "no" response versus open-ended questions that trigger cued recall (e.g., "What 
is your age?"). The latter typically involve larger cognitive loads because examinees may 
have to search their long-term memory. Thus, cognitive cues might be less reliable for the 
detection of deception in this format than for yes/no responses. Walczyk and colleagues 
(2003) and Walczyk and colleagues (2005) discuss that TRI-Con might be considered the 
first approach to lie detection that focuses specifically on maximizing cognitive loads for 
liars while minimizing them for truth-tellers. It furthermore helps to protect from 
countermeasures of lie detection, such as rehearsal. TRI-Con focuses on cues to 
deception such as response time, logical consistency of responses to questions that 
inquire about the same topic, and eye data such as pupil dilation, blinking, and eye 
fixation. 
The activation component in ADCM represents the encoding of questions and the 
retrieval of previously stored episodic or semantic memories. During this step, any 
important encoded information of semantic and episodic knowledge is activated. The 
question occupies the articulatory loop of working memory, and the truthful response is 
retrieved from Long Term Memory (Baddeley, 1992; as cited in Walczyk, et al., in 
press). Truth-tellers typically decide beforehand to answer truthfully and are able to 
access the information quickly and respond within a short time span. This decreases 
response time significantly when compared to liars (Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al , 
2009). 
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The decision component in ADCM, refers to choosing to lie or to tell the truth 
based on the question asked. As previously noted, the motivation for malingering 
includes "financial gain, escaping responsibility, punishment, imprisonment, or military 
duty" (American Psychological Association, 2007, p. 551) and it entails a deliberate act 
of faking or exaggerating illness or disability. Like most other self-serving lies, 
malingering constitutes protection of the self and occurs in order to improve one's 
situation. Liars decide after hearing the question to either lie or tell the truth. This process 
usually increases their response time when compared to truth-tellers. Even rehearsed lies 
take longer because rehearsed liars do not access their truthful memory but rather have to 
remember to tell a lie. This last step seems to be responsible for the increases in time 
lapse noted when someone provides false responses (Walczyk et al., 2009). 
The construction component ADCM consists of fabricating the lie. During this 
phase the truth is a rich retrieval cue to Long Term Memory, whereas lying requires 
attention in order to make it plausible and feasible (Walczyk et al., 2009). Various factors 
such as social context and knowledge about examiners' suspicions impact the creation of 
a lie (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). A screening out of unfeasible or implausible lies takes 
place, also a verification with prior statements, and both of theses processes add to 
response time (DePaulo, Kasky, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). The ADCM, thus, 
provides a theoretical account of the process of lie generation useful for the present 
research. 
Whereas the ADCM is a theoretical account of lying, TRI-Con is a new method 
of lie detection based on the ADCM. TRI-Con involves testing examinees in laboratory-
like conditions. The TRI-Con approach for detecting malingering uses cognitive cues in 
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order to make clear distinctions between truth-tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and 
unrehearsed malingerers. Rehearsal needs to be considered as a possible countermeasure 
to cognitive lie detection (DePaulo et al., 2003). TRI-Con consists of an eye tracking 
laboratory that has the capability to monitor response time and eye data. 
Although many psychological assessments have shown effectiveness in detecting 
malingerers, they are far from failsafe in that they often create false positives and false 
negatives. The existing measures of malingering only allow diagnosis of a possible 
pattern of malingering through false impression management, and they are designed to 
measure global psychological constructs. Even in combination with other processes such 
as clinical interviews and a review of client history, the danger exists that sophisticated 
liars can prepare for the process and "learn" the appropriate symptoms of their 
malingered ailment. Therefore, other measures need to be developed that are more 
objective and are less amenable to manipulation by clients. Another measure is needed to 
assess the truthfulness of declarations about having specific psychological symptoms. 
Response time, eye gaze, pupil dilation, and other eye data can provide cues to a 
person's truthfulness or deception when answering questions. Applying such cognitive 
techniques to assess malingering may minimize examinees' conscious control over such 
responses, especially under the cognitive load-maximizing conditions of TRI-Con. 
Cognitive cues of deception are difficult to monitor and control by individuals and thus 
may provide more reliable data for detecting malingering. TRI-Con is one of these 
approaches for measuring cues that are difficult to alter by the client. It may help the 
medical and psychological fields by providing more accurate assessments and preventing 
malingerers from draining important resources, especially when coupled with eye data. 
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Summary 
Although psychological testing traditionally has been used for the assessment of 
malingering, and other measures are available for identifying people who fake or 
exaggerate existing psychological and physiological problems, the problems of false 
positives and false negatives warrant a search for more effective methods for detecting 
deception. Many of the psychological tests used for diagnosing malingering (e.g., the 
MMPI-2) are at best indirect measures of malingering with the purpose of identifying 
clinical syndromes instead of focusing on specific instances of deception. More direct 
measures of malingering (e.g., TOMM, SIRS) are frequently highly focused either on 
particular symptoms or lying about memory deficits or psychotic symptoms. Another 
problem with psychological testing is the alternative scoring methods which yield 
varying results within the malingering range (e.g., a person could be in extreme distress 
or merely expressing a need for help and score high on the F-scale on the MMPI-2). 
Multiple measures such as testing with several instruments, obtaining a detailed client 
history, and being aware of all possible gains that could be obtained by faking problems, 
could increase effectiveness in detection. These methods, however, are time-consuming 
and subjective, and require clinical judgment. 
Cognitive techniques such as eye gaze, response time, and pupil dilation are 
objectively measurable and are difficult to control by examinees. These methods 
overcome deliberate coaching to provide fake symptoms and also the examinee 
"learning" psychological or medical problems in order to pretend distress. The TRI-Con 
approach, coupled with the collection of eye data, is a computerized method for cognitive 
lie detection. Although still in its infancy, it holds much promise as a more accurate 
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method for detecting malingering. Precision and accuracy in diagnosing malingering has 
the potential to prevent financial drain from resources provide a fairer distribution of 
resources. TRI-Con may replace inaccurate psychological assessments in the future and 
provide clinicians with a clearer picture of their clients' motivation. The current study 
utilizes the TRI-Con method to detect malingering, because it is a potentially more 
reliable method that prevents false positives in the identification of malingerers. 
The purpose of this study is to determine if cognitive cues such as response time, 
eye focus, and pupil dilation can discriminate among rehearsed malingerers, unrehearsed 
malingerers, and truth-tellers. 
Hypotheses 
The following Hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1 
Unrehearsed malingerers will display longer response times than rehearsed 
malingerers who, in turn, will display longer response times than truth-tellers on 
questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms. 
Hypothesis 2 
Unrehearsed malingerers will have fewer eye movements when answering 
questions than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display fewer eye movements 
than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms. 
Hypothesis 3 
Unrehearsed malingerers will have greater pupil dilations as measured by an eye 
tracker than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display greater pupil dilations as 
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measured by an eye tracker than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their 
psychological or physical symptoms. 
Hypothesis 4 
The time required to answer questions will significantly discriminate between 
unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. 
Hypothesis 5 
Pupil dilation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers, 
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. 
Hypothesis 6 
Gaze fixation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers, 
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. 
Hypothesis 7 
The combination of response times, pupil dilation, and gaze fixation will provide 
criteria for categorizations of unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and 
truth-tellers significantly better than any of these cues in isolation. 
CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
The purpose of this study was to determine if cognitive cues, such as response 
time, gaze fixation as vertical and horizontal eye movements, and pupil dilation can 
discriminate among rehearsed malingerers, unrehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. A 
questionnaire was developed to collect demographic information from the volunteer 
participants of this study. A set of four different scenarios was created, providing 
instructions to respond in accordance with different malingering conditions. 
Participants 
A total of 108 undergraduate and graduate participants were recruited from 
psychology courses at a mid-sized southern university in the United States after approval 
for this research had been obtained from the university's Internal Review Board (IRB). A 
copy of the IRB approval application packet appears in Appendix A. Attempts were made 
to recruit an ethnically diverse sample. Of the 108 participants, 37 (34.3%) were male, 70 
(64.8%) female, and one response to gender was omitted (.9%). The participants reported 
19 different college majors. Age range was from 18 to 60 (M = 21.278, SD = 5.275). 
Twenty participants (18.5%) identified themselves as African-American, 81 (75%) as 
Caucasian-American, one (.9%) as Native-American, three (2.8%) as 
Latino/Latina/Hispanic, and three (2.8%) as other ethnicity. For religious affiliation, one 
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(.9%) participant was Atheist, two (1.9%) Jewish, one (.9%) Buddhist, 94 (87%) 
Christian, two (1.9%) Hindi, and eight (7.4%) other. Forty (37%) of the participants 
were Freshman, 15 (13.9%) Sophomore, 20 (18.5%) Junior, 15 (13.9%) Senior, and 18 
(16.7%) graduate students. For marital status, 99 (91.7%) were single and nine (8.3%) 
were married. English was the first language for 105 (97.2%) of the participants. 
Students were offered extra credit by their instructors in exchange for their 
participation. An alternative non-research assignment was available for students who did 
not wish to participate but who wanted to obtain comparable extra credit. All participants 
were treated in accordance with the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct (American Psychological Association, 2002). All data was held in strict 
confidence. Students' names were recorded only for extra credit notification to the 
instructors and were separated from their data. Moreover, the data was reviewed only by 
the researcher and research assistants. 
Instrumentation 
Demographic Questionnaire 
A demographic questionnaire, developed by the experimenter, was administered. 
It has eight questions regarding participants' sex, age, ethnicity, religion, student 
classification (year in school), college major, marital status, and number of children. 
Participants were instructed to either fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate responses 
to each item (see APPENDIX B). 
Malingering Scenarios and Related Questions 
Each of the four malingering scenarios was developed by this researcher, and 
required participants to adopt different roles. By describing a situation in which 
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malingering is a viable option for attaining certain advantages or to avoiding unpleasant 
consequences. The scenarios were written to reflect hypothetical situations that are 
realistic and could happen to the participants. They involve sustaining an injury at work 
and having the opportunity to receive unjustified time off after being healed (doctor 
scenario); missing an exam without a legitimate reason (instructor scenario); recovering 
from a psychological disability and then having the opportunity of receiving unjustified 
disability payments (disability scenario), and being involved in a car accident (judge 
scenario). 
In each scenario the main character (role adopted by the participant) is faced with 
the dilemma of providing honest feedback (truth teller condition) and possibly risking a 
variety of disadvantages or coming up with convincing deceptive responses (unrehearsed 
malingering condition, rehearsed malingering condition) and gaining those advantages. 
Possible hypothetical risks for the truth-tellers entailed: (a) not being able to use earned 
sick leave for staying at home for additional time after having recovered from a work-
related injury; (b) receiving an "F" on a make-up exam resulting in failing a college 
course, losing financial aid, and experiencing a decrease of the overall GPA; (c) being 
rejected for disability payments for a recovered psychological illness; and (d) receiving 
monetary damages for a non-existing physical condition after a car accident during which 
the main character was psychologically attacked by the guilty party. The scenarios were 
developed so that individuals from diverse backgrounds could relate to their main 
character role and would be able to quickly comprehend what is at stake and what 
advantages could be gained if they could successfully malinger. 
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Each scenario was followed by a set of eight to nine short questions designed to 
elicit either yes/no or open-ended responses. For example, a yes/no question from the 
instructor scenario was "Were you sick?" An example of an open-ended question for the 
same scenario was "What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness?" According to TRI-
Con, yes/no questions and open-ended questions impose different cognitive loads on 
examinees and should be analyzed separately (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 
2005; Walczyk et al., 2009). Yes/no questions involve recognition memory. For instance, 
the question "Have you ever been arrested?" provides the target experience that a 
participant needs only verify or deny by searching memory. Open-ended questions 
generally require cued recall, a less sensitive memory measure. As an example, "How 
many times have you been late for my class?", if asked by an instructor, would require 
the recall and tallying of several separate instances of episodic memories, a potentially 
time consuming error prone endeavor. The questions were also created for monitoring for 
consistency of the responses. All of the scenarios had three pairs of sentences that were 
potentially contradictory for consistency checks. For example, during the judge scenario 
participants were asked "Did you receive any bodily injuries?" and also "What were your 
bodily injuries?" This feature allowed the researcher to monitor if participants 
consistently replied according to their malingering condition and also if they remembered 
the details of their assumed roles. 
The ETL 400 and the Eye Tracking Task 
Eye Tracking Laboratory 
The ISCAN ETL-400 Tabletop Remote Eye Tracking Laboratory, by ISCAN, 
Inc. of Burlington, MA, is an integrated research laboratory which collects eye tracking 
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data in the form of pupil size, eye movements, blinking, corneal reflection, and visual 
point of regard data of participants in response to presented stimuli. A remote infrared 
camera was mounted on a pan/tilt platform on a desk facing the examinee. It has the 
ability to track the participant's head in order to keep the eye in the camera's center field 
during testing. This camera obtained a clear image of the eye without its illumination 
being visible to the participant. ISCAN automatically records the data. The system can be 
adjusted quickly to produce information about point of regard, which is the correlation 
between raw eye position and the examinee's precise focal point on a computer screen. The 
obtained data was superimposed in real-time to the eye tracking monitor. Changes in speed 
of eye movements were recorded during the experiment. Recordings of velocity, response 
time, and all verbalizations during the experiment were stored on the eye tracking computer. 
ISCAN allows for quick calibration. The examinee sat in a comfortable chair responding to 
the pre-recorded questions while the examiner ensured that the procedures are understood 
and followed. 
The TRI-Con approach was used for detecting malingerers because of its potential 
to provide cognitive lie detection. Although it is an unconventional method in detecting 
malingering at this time, it might provide greater accuracy and a better differentiation 
between malingerers and truth-tellers than would be afforded by a cognitive lie detector 
focused on cognitive cues to deception. 
Before answering questions under TRI-Con, each participant's head was 
positioned on a head stand located approximately two feet in front of a computer screen 
on which was displaced a tree-lined country scene. The infrared eye scanner was just 
below the computer screen; about 1.5 feet in front of the participant's face but did not 
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obstruct his or her view of the screen. Before each round of questions (those for the 
practice scenario or the four test scenarios), the ETL 400 Infrared Eye Tracker was 
calibrated (or recalibrated) for the participant. The examiner would ask the participant to 
look in the top left of the screen, top right, bottom left, and bottom right, while the ETL 
400 registered eye position via mouse clicks. For each question, the computer controlling 
the eye tracker would send a signal over a serial port connected to a second computer that 
presented the scenario questions and recorded responses digitally using Audacity. The eye 
data would be available for analysis from when a given question was fully asked to when 
a participant answered the question. 
The ETL 400 takes 60 "snapshots" of the eye per second. In each instance, the 
pupil dilation, point of regard (where on the screen), and other variables were stored in an 
ASCII file that can be read by other software for analysis. Following calibration, the 
computer screen, which participants were told to focus on during testing, has a virtual 
coordinate system of pixels corresponding to where participants are looking on it. The 
origin is in the upper, left hand corner (horizontals, vertical=0). The bottom right has 
coordinates horizontal^ 11, vertical=511. Thus, units of pupil dilation and other eye data 
are expressed in pixels falling within a horizontal and vertical range of 0 to 512. For each 
question, the time needed to answer bounded the relevant eye data for that question. If it 
took 1.5 seconds, a total of 90 eye snapshots were available. The median pupil dilation 
during that time was taken as the measure of pupil dilation. On the advice of personnel at 
I-Scan, Inc. of Woburn, Massachusetts, manufacturers of the ETC 400, the standard 
deviations of the horizontal and vertical points of regard while answering a question 
were calculated and used as the measures of eye movement. Because they are in standard 
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deviation units, they are also expressed in pixels of movement. Based on previous 
research, greater pupil dilation and smaller eye movement were interpreted in the present 
research as indicative of greater cognitive load. 
Audacity Software 
Audacity, a free, open source recording and editing software, was downloaded for 
recording the questions and answers of each scenario. Audacity software has been 
developed by a group of experts and is currently distributed under the GNU General 
Public License. Audacity digitally records live audio input and converts the auditory 
information into digital representations which enable users to change the speed or pitch 
of the recorded files (Audacity Source, 2009). 
Audacity allows experimenters to analyze recordings by providing graphic 
representations of pitch and frequency. For example, silence is represented as a flat line, 
whereas any type of sound is manifested as waves, their height increasing with volume. 
The graphics of the program do not discriminate between voice sounds or background 
noises and register any auditory information graphically. 
Response Time Measurement 
Each participant's answers to questions were saved in a separate Audacity file. 
Audacity allows determining the time needed to answer a question to the millisecond 
level of precision. The software provided a visual metric, much like a meter stick, that 
measured time visually as the length on the screen between waves. Recordings were also 
transcribed verbatim, allowing the coding for consistency across inter-related questions 
and for the presence of filler (utterances that are non-responsive to questions). 
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Consistency Coding 
Walczyk and colleagues (2009) describe inconsistent answers as explicitly or 
implicitly contradicting previously provided answers or answers that are impossible in 
reality. For example, if participants replied "Yes" to Question 2 ("Did you receive any 
bodily injuries?") during the judge scenario, they were also expected to provide a short 
description of the type of their injuries for Question 4 ("What were your bodily 
injuries?"), not say "None," If participants provided a "Yes" response to the first 
question, but were unable to name their injury, it was coded as an instance of 
inconsistency for this scenario. Consistency requires memorization of the previously 
asked question and the answer given. Furthermore, inconsistencies provided responses 
checks on their adherence with the experimental instructions. For example, participants 
who were asked to malinger and answered "Yes" to Question 7 ("Are you ready to return 
to work?") during the doctor scenario, were inconsistent with their overall role for their 
experimental condition. The consistent response would have been "No" because 
participants were instructed to malinger and gain additional sick leave in order to stay at 
home (three question pairs as consistency checks for all the scenarios). Inconsistent 
responses were summed up across scenarios for each participant to give the total number 
of inconsistencies, which was used in the exploratory analyses. APPENDIX C shows the 
coding forms indicating the pairs of questions that were inter-related and served as 
consistency checks. 
Filler Coding 
Filler is any verbal utterance which is non-responsive to the question. Examples 
are "uhm" and "ahh." For this study, instances of filler were counted when they preceded 
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the actual answer, usually prolonging the response time. The instances of such filler were 
tallied for each of the scenarios. When an answer began with filler, for example, "Uhm, 
no", "No" was considered the time when the actual answer began. This provided more 
accurate response times. For the exploratory analysis, instances of filler were summed 
across the scenarios for each participant. 
Procedure 
General Procedures for All Conditions 
First informed consent was obtained from each participant, and any of their 
questions were answered. Participants were informed then about their experimental 
condition by a greeter, which was done randomly. Greeters read to participants 
instructions appropriate to their conditions. Participants were escorted to the eye tracking 
laboratory. 
A Practice Scenario and practice questions preceded the four test scenarios. 
Examinees in all three malingering conditions (rehearsed malingering, unrehearsed 
malingering, truth-telling) all read through the same four test scenarios. What 
differentiated experimental conditions were their instructions concerning how to respond 
specifically to the questions. Truth-tellers were instructed to tell the truth to all questions 
according to their assigned roles; whereas participants in the two malingering conditions 
were instructed to deceive. The rehearsed malingerers were the only group able to review 
the questions pertaining to the scenarios and were able to prepare their deceptive answers 
in advance according to their assigned roles. The other two conditions (unrehearsed 
malingering, truth-telling) were asked the same questions, but again, without an 
opportunity to rehearse their responses. Questions to each scenario were designed to elicit 
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yes/no or short answers, consistent with recommendations for conducting lie detection 
examinations under TRI-Con (Walczyk et al., 2005). A copy of the scenarios and related 
questions appears in APPENDIX D. The instructions summarized below make clear the 
task required of participants in each condition. 
Roles of the Greeter and the Examiner 
This experiment required two experimenters: (a) a greeter who obtained informed 
consent, assigned malingering conditions, read instructions, collected information via 
demographic questionnaires, and debriefed participants (Debriefing Statement see 
APPENDIX E), and (b) a TRI-Con examiner who started the testing program, calibrated 
the eye tracker, and monitored eye movements of the participants during the experiment 
to ensure accuracy of the data. The examiner also read the scenarios to participants as the 
latter followed along holding a hard copy (Instructions for Greeters appear in Appendix 
F; Instructions for Examiners appear in APPENDIX G). 
Instructions for Truth-tellers, Rehearsed Liars, and Unrehearsed Liars 
A general set of instructions provided an overview of the procedures under TRI-
Con, an overview of the scenarios, and so forth. A copy appears in Appendix H. 
Truth-tellers 
Truth-tellers were asked to reply honestly to all questions pertaining to the 
scenario according to the roles they were asked to adopt in each scenario. They were 
advised to answer as convincing as possible. 
Unrehearsed Malingerers 
Unrehearsed malingerers were asked to provide untruthful responses to all 
questions pertaining to the scenario according to their assigned roles. They were advised 
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to be as convincing as possible and to fake psychological or physiological distress in 
order to obtain an advantage or avoid a punishment. 
Rehearsed Malingerers 
These participants received the exact same instructions from the greeter 
concerning how to respond that the unrehearsed malingerers did. However, before the 
testing under TRI-Con for each scenario, participants were given copies of the related 
questions and were allowed three minutes in which to prepare deceptive answers. 
For all three conditions, the scenarios were read slowly by the examiner in the eye 
tracking laboratory. A hard copy of each scenario was given to the participants so that 
they could follow along. Questions had been digitally recorded previously and asked after 
each scenario was read. All answers were digitally recorded. The same procedure was 
followed for the other three scenarios. The order of the four test scenarios was 
randomized over participants to control for possible order effects. 
Participants wore a microphone headset that was connected to a desktop 
computer. The microphone was positioned close to the examinee's mouth. The computer 
recorded answers using Audacity. Participants were seated in a comfortable chair facing 
away the examiner, who sat at a computer screen controlling the eye tracker. Examiners 
were also blind to the malingering condition in order to minimize experimental bias. 
Data Analysis 
This study is a between-subjects design and had 34 participants in the unrehearsed 
malingering condition, 34 participants in the rehearsed malingering condition, and 40 
participants in the truth-telling experimental condition. In order to simplify this 
complicated data set to an analyzable form, median response times, pupil dilation, and 
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eye movements were determined for each question type (yes/no, open-ended) within each 
scenario for each participant. Using the medians of these measures avoided the 
potentially skewing effects of influential outliers which are common in these kinds of 
data (Hays, 1994; Walczyk et al., 2009). The data gathering for each question began 
when the digitally recorded question had been fully asked and was terminated when the 
participant first began his/her answer. A One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
followed by the Newman-Keuls post-hoc procedure (Hays, 1994) was used to analyze the 
data. ANOVAS are hypothesis-testing statistical procedures that evaluate mean 
differences between different experimental conditions (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2004). 
In review, for this study, the malingering conditions (Independent Variables) 
were: (a) truth-telling, (b) rehearsed malingering, and (c) unrehearsed malingering. The 
measured outcomes (Dependent Variables) were: (a) response times, (b) horizontal eye 
movement, (c) vertical eye movement, and (c) pupil dilation. 
The means for the response times, eye movement data, and pupil dilation for each 
participant were calculated and analyzed. These means were compared across the three 
experimental conditions and question types. The purpose of this analysis was to 
determine if cognitive data differs between truth-tellers and individuals who are 
malingering. The impact of rehearsal also was analyzed by comparing the data from 
rehearsed malingerers with that of unrehearsed malingerers and that of truth-tellers. 
The initially proposed discriminant analyses could not be conducted due to 
technical problems with the recording of the eye data and the resulting low numbers of 
participants in each condition. Thus, it was impossible to have separate calibrations and 
validation sub-samples. 
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For Hypotheses 1 through 3, a one-way ANOVA was used to analyze the mean 
differences in response times, eye gaze (horizontal and vertical eye movements), and 
pupil dilation between truth-tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and unrehearsed malingerers. 
Hypotheses 4 through 7 were untestable because, as explained above, the discriminant 
function analysis was not possible. 
Hypothesis 1 
Response times were determined for each question from each of the four 
scenarios and determined to the millisecond precision. Missing data, which occurred due 
to random technical glitches such as the examiner failing to reactivate the Audacity 
recorder for a particular question, were excluded from the analysis. This happened 
infrequently (< 2% of the scores). 
Hypothesis 2 
Eye gaze was measured by the ETL 400 separately as horizontal eye movement 
and vertical eye movement and recorded as numerical data. These numbers are expressed 
in screen pixels and correspond to average eye movements made during the time used to 
answer each question. The total possible number of pixels horizontally and vertically is 
512. Missing data were excluded from analyses (< 2% of the scores). 
Hypothesis 3 
Pupil dilation was measured and recorded as numerical data by the ETL 400 eye 
tracker. As with eye movements, pupil dilation was measured in screen pixel units with a 
possible range from 0 to 512. The data used for each question was the median level of 
pupil dilation during the time the participant used to answer a given question. Recall that 
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the ETL 400 takes 60 "pictures" of the eye each second. Again, missing data were not 
entered (<2% of the scores). 
Hypotheses 4 through 7 
Hypotheses 4 through 7 concerned using response times, pupil dilation, and gaze 
fixation (the opposite of eye movements) as cues to deception in K-means discriminate 
analyses. However, as noted above, technical problems, missing data, and an insufficient 
number of participants tested resulted in insufficient sample size to support the 




The purpose of this chapter is to present the statistical results of the experiment. 
The following section provides the means, standard deviations, and total number of 
participants for each experimental condition for relevant Hypotheses 1-3. Results of 
exploratory analyses also are provided. 
Participants 
The sample for this experiment consisted of adult college students ranging in age 
from 18 to 60 years who were enrolled in undergraduate/graduate college courses at a 
midsize southern university. A total of 108 participants completed the study. However, 
due to initial technical problems with the eye tracker, only 90 of these produced 
successfully recorded eye data (eye movements and pupil dilation), and these comprised 
the sample used in the data analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 were tested using the statistical procedure of a 2 x 3 
mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The within-subjects factor was question type 
with two levels: yes/no, open-ended. The between-subjects factor was the malingering 
condition with three levels: unrehearsed malingering, rehearsed malingering, and truth-
telling. In the significant main effect for malingering condition, the studentized Newman-
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Keuls procedure (Hays, 1994) was used to determine those means that were significantly 
different at alpha of .05. Although no hypotheses specifically concerned question type, it 
was expected based on past research that yes/no questions would entail shorter response 
times and less cognitive load (less pupil dilation; more eye movement) than open-ended 
questions (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, 
& Griffith-Ross, 2009). Effect sizes in the form of eta squared (fj2) are reported for all 
significant main or interactive effects. 
Results for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I 
Unrehearsed malingerers will display longer response times than rehearsed 
malingerers who, in turn, will display longer response times than truth-tellers on 
questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms. 
Means and standard deviations for response times are reported in Table 1 by 
scenario, question type, and condition. Regarding the doctor scenario, a significant main 
effect was found for question type, F(l, 104) = 76.552,/? = .000, r\2 = .424. There were 
significantly longer response times for open-ended questions than for yes/no questions, 
replicating previous research (e.g., Walczyk et al., 2009). There also was a significant 
main effect for the malingering condition, F(2, 104) = 3.411, p = .037, rj2 = .062. The 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc procedure revealed a significant difference only between 
truth-tellers and unrehearsed malingerers. The experimental condition x question type 
interaction also was significant, F(l, 104) = 7317, p = .001. It can be seen in Table 1 that 
responses to yes/no questions are similar across malingering conditions. For open-ended 
questions, however, there is a large difference between malingerers and truth-tellers. 
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Open-ended questions provided the best cues to deception. Hypothesis 1 was partially 
supported in this case. 
A significant main effect was found for question type in the instructor scenario, 
F(l, 102) = 89.752,/? = .000, x\2= .468. There were significantly longer response times 
for open-ended questions. There was no significant main effect for the malingering 
condition, F(2, 102) = 1.767,/? = .176, however, the malingering condition x question 
type interaction was significant, F(l, 102) = 4.675,/? = .011. Larger differences between 
unrehearsed malingerers and truth-tellers were observed for open-ended than yes/no 
questions (see Table 1). Hypothesis 1 was not supported in this case. 
For the disability scenario, a significant main effect was again found for question 
type, F(l, 104) = 92.241,p = .000, if = .470. There were significantly longer response 
times for open-ended questions. However, there was no significant main effect for 
experimental condition, F(2,104) = 1.865,/? = .160, nor was the malingering condition x 
question type interaction significant, F(2, 104) = .023,/? = .977. Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported in this instance. 
Regarding the judge scenario, a significant main effect was again found for 
question type, F(l, 104) = 25.599,/? = .000, r\2= .198. There also were significantly 
longer response times for open-ended questions. Furthermore, there was a significant 
main effect for malingering condition, F(2,104) = 8.396, /? = .000, if = .139. The 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc procedure revealed significant differences between truth-tellers 
and unrehearsed malingerers as well as between truth-tellers and rehearsed malingerers. 
The malingering condition x question type interaction also was significant, 
F{2,104) = 2.396,/? = .096, rj2=. 044. Examination of means from Table 1 reveal large 
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differences for open-ended questions only, and smaller differences for the yes/no 
questions. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported in this case. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Response Times by Question Type, Scenario, and Malingering 
Condition 
Malingering Condition 
Question Type Truth Unrehearsed Rehearsed 
Tellers Malingerers Malingerers 
M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Yes/No Response Times 
Doctor .851 .237 40 
Instructor 1.073 .347 40 
Disability .793 .258 40 
Judge .792 .314 40 
Open-ended Response Times 
Doctor .942 .314 40 
Instructor 1.268 .443 40 
Disability 1.036 .274 40 
Judge .976 .332 40 
.937.399 34 .931 .338 33 
1.020.301 34 .877 .331 31 
.934.350 34 .838 .233 33 
1.160.555 34 .916 .307 33 
1.241 .457 34 1.164 .392 33 
1.458.492 34 1.287 .347 31 
1.179.522 34 1.070 .379 33 
1.245 .407 34 1.203 .353 33 
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Hypothesis 2 
Unrehearsed malingerers will have fewer eye movements when answering 
questions than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display fewer eye movements 
than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms. 
Summary statistics for horizontal eye movements appear in Table 2 by 
malingering condition, scenarios, and question type. The next four analyses concerned 
the horizontal eye movement data. For the doctor scenario, a significant main effect was 
found for question type, F{\, 61) = 9.015,p = .004, r\ = .129. There was significantly 
greater horizontal eye movement for yes/no questions, which suggested lower cognitive 
load, consistent with expectations. However, there was no significant main effect for the 
malingering condition, F(2, 61) = .977, p = .382, nor was the malingering condition x 
question type interaction significant, F(2, 61) = .459, p = .634. Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported in this case. 
A significant main effect was found for question type for the instructor scenario, 
F(l, 84) = 36.630, p = .000, r\2= .304. Significantly greater horizontal eye movement for 
open-ended questions was found, the opposite of what was found in the doctor scenario, 
and inconsistent with expectations (Walczyk et al., 2005). However, there was no 
significant main effect for experimental condition, F(2, 84) = .050, p = .951. The 
experimental condition x question type interaction also was not significant, 
F(2, 84) = .088, p = .916. Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
In the disability scenario, a significant main effect was found for question type, 
F{\, 84) = 5.890,/? = .017, f|2= .066. As for the instructor scenario, there was 
significantly greater horizontal eye movement for open-ended questions, contrary to 
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expectations. There was no significant main effect for malingering condition, F(2, 84) = 
1.952,/? = . 148, nor was the malingering condition x question type interaction significant, 
F(2, 84) = .152, p = .634. Hypothesis 2 was, again, not supported. 
Regarding the judge scenario, no significant main effect was found for question 
type, F(l, 84) = .550, p = .461, contrary to the other scenarios. There was no significant 
difference in horizontal eye movement between yes/no and open-ended questions. There 
was no significant main effect for malingering condition, F(2, 84) = .488,/? = .616. The 
malingering condition x question type interaction also was not significant, 
F(2, 84) = 2.277, p = .109. Hypothesis 2 was not supported here as well. Overall, the 
pattern of results across the scenarios was a lack of support for Hypothesis 2 with the 
horizontal eye movement data. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Horizontal Eye Movements by Question Type, Scenario and 
Malingering Condition 
Malingering Condition 
Question Type Truth Unrehearsed Rehearsed 
Tellers Malingerers Malingerers 
M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Yes/No 
Horizontal Eye Movement 
Doctor 62.164 25.949 25 
Instructor 52.321 38.674 35 
Disability 60.230 36.989 34 
Judge 61.495 39.328 34 
Open-ended 
Horizontal Eye Movement 
Doctor 52.867 28.207 25 
Instructor 72.875 39.305 35 
Disability 66.417 34.165 34 
Judge 68.380 39.659 34 
54.279 32.610 20 71.557 38.770 19 
49.543 39.565 26 52.567 30.944 26 
48.97137.047 26 66.312 39.634 27 
60.12141.441 26 72.648 34.414 27 
47.349 34.558 20 56.378 36.171 19 
69.998 41.275 26 70.15134.452 26 
52.908 37.396 26 73.506 38.400 27 
61.532 40.697 26 68.977 33.059 27 
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Summary statistics for the vertical eye movement data are provided in Table 3. 
Regarding the doctor scenario, a significant main effect occurred for question type, 
F(l, 61) = 8.686,;? - .005, fj2 = .125. There was significantly greater vertical eye 
movement for yes/no questions, just as occurred with the doctor scenario with horizontal 
eye movement. Again, this was expected. However, there was no significant main effect 
for the malingering condition, F(2, 61) = .920, p = .404. The malingering condition x 
question type interaction was not significant, F(2, 61) = 1.445,/? = .244. Hypothesis 2 
was, again, not confirmed. 
In the instructor scenario, a significant main effect was found for question type, 
F(l, 84) = 33.807, p = .000, if = .287. There was significantly greater vertical eye 
movement for open-ended questions, again, inconsistent with the doctor scenario and 
inconsistent with expectations of greater cognitive load with open-ended questions. 
However, there was no significant main effect for malingering condition, F(2, 84) = .178, 
p = .837. Again the malingering condition x question type interaction was not significant, 
F(2, 84) = .232, p = .794. Hypothesis 2 was not supported in this scenario. 
A significant main effect was found for question type for the disability scenario, 
F(l, 84) - 5.664,/? = .020, if = .063. There was significantly greater vertical eye 
movement for open-ended questions, contrary to expectations. The main effect for 
malingering condition was not significant, F(2, 84) = 1.388,/? = .255, as was the 
malingering condition x question type interaction, F(2, 84) = .621,/? = .540. Again, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
For the judge scenario, a significant main effect also was found for question type, 
F(l, 84) = 4.846,/? = .030, if = .055. There were significantly greater vertical eye 
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movements for open-ended questions, contrary to expectations. However, there was no 
significant main effect in the malingering condition, F(2, 84) = .964, p = .386, nor for the 
malingering condition x question type interaction, F(2, 84) = .957,p = .388. Hypothesis 
2, again, was not supported. As with the horizontal eye movement data, the overall 
pattern with of the vertical eye movement data provides no support for Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics for Vertical Eye Movement by Question Type, Scenario and 
Malingering Condition 
Malingering Condition 
Question Type Truth 
Tellers 
M SD N 
Unrehearsed 
Malingerers 
M SD N 
Rehearsed 
Malingerers 
M SD N 
Yes/No 
Vertical Eye Movement 
Doctor 59.076 28.733 25 55.036 34.667 20 74.909 44.833 19 
Instructor 48.010 34.200 35 42.465 31.712 26 49.933 32.580 26 
56.679 33.185 34 




Vertical Eye Movement 
Doctor 52.447 26.657 25 
46.892 36.469 26 62.522 43.338 27 
55.859 39.891 26 67.591 35.226 27 
50.058 34.459 20 56.608 38.611 19 
Instructor 64.914 33.343 35 63.016 34.10126 65.378 39.190 26 
Disability 58.533 30.114 34 52.329 36.57126 69.484 42.994 27 
Judge 61.937 32.750 34 58.507 38.053 26 69.774 35.364 27 
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Hypothesis 3 
Unrehearsed malingerers will have greater pupil dilations as measured by an eye 
tracker than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display greater pupil dilations as 
measured by an eye tracker than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their 
psychological or physical symptoms. 
Means and standard deviations for pupil dilation can be found in Table 4. In the 
doctor scenario, no significant main effect was found for question type, F(l,61) = 1.043, 
p = .311. In other words, there was no significant difference in pupil dilation between 
yes/no and open-ended questions, contrary to expectation. There was no significant main 
effect for malingering condition, F(2,61) = .038,/* = .963. Also, the experimental 
condition x question type interaction was not significant, F(2,61) = .739, p = .482. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported in the doctor scenario. 
A significant main effect was found for question type for the instructor scenario, 
F(l,85) = 42.191,/? = .000, f|2= .332. There was significantly greater pupil dilation for 
open-ended questions, which makes sense given their expected greater cognitive load. 
However, there was no significant main effect for the malingering condition, F(2,85) = 
.270, p = .764. Finally, the malingering condition x question type interaction was 
nonsignificant, F(2,85) = .135,/? = .874. Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
A significant main effect was found in the disability scenario for question type, 
F(l,86) = 4.892, p = .030, f|2 = .054. As expected, there was significantly greater pupil 
dilation for open-ended questions. However, there was no significant main effect for the 
malingering condition, F(2,86) = .088,/? = .916. Also, the malingering condition x 
question type interaction was non-significant, F(2, 85) = 1.657, p = .197. Hypothesis 3 
again was not supported. 
No significant main effect was found for question type in the judge scenario, F(l, 
86) = 1.876, p = . 174. There was no significant difference in pupil dilation between 
yes/no and open-ended questions, nor was there a significant main effect in the 
malingering condition, F(2, 86) = .383, p = .683. Not surprisingly, the malingering 
condition x question type interaction nonsignificant, F(2, 86) = 1.153, p = .320. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported for this scenario. Across the four scenarios, there is no 
support for the hypotheses that malingering entails more pupil dilation than truth-telling 
or that rehearsal lowers cognitive load. 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for Pupil Dilation by Question Type, Scenario and Malingering 
Condition 
Malingering Condition 
Question Type Truth Unrehearsed Rehearsed 
Tellers Malingerers Malingerers 
M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Yes/No Pupil Dilation 
Doctor 69.124 14.144 25 
Instructor 59.175 19.459 35 
Disability 67.267 14.788 35 
Judge 66.929 14.255 35 
Open-ended Pupil Dilation 
Doctor 69.432 14.613 25 
Instructor 70.384 15.278 35 
Disability 68.746 15.404 35 
Judge 66.870 15.570 35 
70.775 18.184 20 69.586 12.585 19 
60.887 22.560 27 63.194 21.534 26 
68.637 15.441 27 68.382 12.724 27 
68.328 11.106 27 69.417 12.520 27 
69.829 15.967 20 68.713 12.337 19 
72.118 15.635 27 72.573 12.703 26 
70.343 14.660 27 68.195 13.183 27 
69.953 13.309 27 69.789 11.791 27 
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Hypothesis 4 
The time required to answer questions will significantly discriminate between 
unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and truth- tellers. 
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples 
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could 
not be tested. 
Hypothesis 5 
Pupil dilation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers, 
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. 
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples 
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could 
not be tested. 
Hypothesis 6 
Gaze fixation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers, 
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. 
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples 
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could 
not be tested. 
Hypothesis 7 
The combination of response times, pupil dilation, and gaze fixation will provide 
criteria for categorizations of unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and truth-
tellers significantly better than any of these cues in isolation. 
70 
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples 
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could 
not be tested. 
Exploratory Analysis 
The following exploratory analyses were conducted. No specific hypotheses were 
put forth in the introduction concerning these analyses, however, contradictions across 
questions and filler have been proposed as possible cues to deception (Walczyk et al., 
2003; Walczyk et a., 2005; Walczyk et a., 2009). A one-way ANOVA was used for the 
exploratory analyses. 
No significant main effect was found for filler in the malingering condition, 
F(2, 105) = 1.159, p = .318, however, significant main effects were found for 
inconsistencies, F(2, 105) = 4.732, p = .011. Surprisingly, participants in the truth-telling 
condition had significantly more inconsistencies than the unrehearsed and rehearsed 
malingerers. Means, standard deviations, and numbers of participants for each 
experimental condition for inconsistencies and filler appear in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for Filler and Inconsistencies by Malingering Condition 
Malingering Condition 
Truth Unrehearsed Rehearsed 
Tellers Malingerers Malingerers 
M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Filler .925 2.759 40 1.971 4.210 34 1.088 2.021 34 
Total Inconsistencies 1.075 2.093 40 .265 .994 34 .148 .558 34 
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Summary of Results 
Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes for response times, horizontal eye 
movements, vertical eye movements, and pupil dilation were calculated for each question 
type (yes/no, open-ended) and malingering condition (truth-tellers, rehearsed 
malingerers, unrehearsed malingerers) by using a mixed-model ANOVA. The 
studentized Newman-Keuls procedure (Hays, 1994) was used to determine means that 
were significantly different at an alpha of .05 in the case of the malingering condition. 
Findings from the study partially supported Hypothesis 1 because response times 
differed significantly for malingering conditions across two of the four scenarios (doctor 
and judge). As predicted, truth-tellers had significantly shorter response times than both 
groups of malingerers. However, the hypothesized significant difference between 
rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers was not found. Therefore, rehearsal did not have a 
significant impact on response time. 
Horizontal eye movements did not differ significantly across malingering 
conditions. Hypothesis 2 predicted that truth-tellers would have significantly more eye 
movement than rehearsed malingerers, who in turn would have significantly more eye 
movement than the unrehearsed malingerers. High levels of eye movement indicate less 
of a cognitive load (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk, Mahoney, 
Doverspike & Griffith-Ross, 2009). Therefore, the horizontal eye movement data does 
not support Hypothesis 2. The vertical eye movements also failed to support Hypothesis 2 
with no significant differences of vertical eye movements across the malingering 
conditions. 
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Similar to the eye movement, pupil dilation failed to support previous findings 
that increases in pupil dilation due to increased cognitive load occurs due to deception. 
No significant differences in pupil dilation were found across the malingering conditions. 
Hypotheses 4 through 7 could not be tested because of the inability to perform a 
discriminant analysis. The overall findings of the study suggest that response time is the 
best cognitive cue of malingering. However, response time fails to discriminate between 
rehearsed and unrehearsed malingering. 
Filler and inconsistencies were counted for each malingering condition. Whereas 
no significant difference was found for the frequency of filler in each condition, there 
were significantly more inconsistencies for truth-tellers than for malingerers. This 
surprising finding, among others, will be interpreted in the discussion that follows. 
CHAPTER4 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this experiment was to explore whether or not cognitive data 
(response time, eye gaze, and pupil dilation) can provide significant discrimination 
between individuals who are telling the truth, individuals who have rehearsed their 
malingering, and individuals who malinger without the possibility for rehearsal. The 
independent variables for this experimental design were the three treatment conditions: 
(a) truth-telling, (b) unrehearsed malingering, and (c) rehearsed malingering. The 
dependent variables were the cognitive cues for detecting malingering: (a) response time, 
(b) horizontal eye movements, (c) vertical eye movements, and (d) pupil dilation. 
Differences based on answer type (yes/no versus open-ended) also were examined. 
Exploratory analysis focused on the relationship between experimental condition and the 
number of inconsistent responses. Another exploratory analysis was conducted in order to 
determine relationships between experimental condition and the number of initial filler 
used by the participants. 
The following discussion of this experiment begins with an overall description of 
the research. Then, the seven proposed hypotheses are discussed separately and 
interpreted. Two types of exploratory analyses will be described and interpreted before 
providing an overall discussion of the results. The final portion of this chapter is 
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dedicated to suggestions for further research in this area and identifying limitations of 
this experiment. 
Overview 
The purpose of this experiment was the development of a research model in order 
to explore the effectiveness of cognitive cues for the detection of malingering. Cognitive 
cues were chosen because they provide an observable measure of cognitive load which 
differs depending on the demands placed on memory and overall thought processes. 
Truth-tellers are assumed to have a smaller cognitive load because they search their 
memory for existing factual information whereas individuals who answer deceptively 
have an increased cognitive load due not only to having to search their memory for the 
existing truthful response but also having to create new information that alters the truth. 
Rehearsal of deception is supposed to decrease the cognitive load because these 
individuals have the opportunity to prepare their answers and store this new information 
in memory for later retrieval, however, it their cognitive load is still larger than that of 
truth-tellers. 
The current malingering study found partial support for previous research 
studying cognitive data in the context of lie detection. Response times were analyzed 
across the three different malingering conditions and also across question type (yes/no 
versus open-ended). Whereas response time was found to partially differentiate between 
malingerers and truth-tellers, it failed to provide this differentiation across all question 
types. It also failed to differentiate between rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers. Eye 
gaze was measured as horizontal and vertical eye movements and also was analyzed 
across the malingering conditions and the question type. This cognitive measure did not 
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provide significant differences between the malingering groups. Another type of 
cognitive data that failed to provide significant identification of each malingering 
condition was pupil dilation. The following conclusions provide an interpretation of the 
results for each of the seven hypotheses. 
Conclusion 
A discussion of each of the first three hypotheses will follow. Hypotheses 4 
through 7 could not be further investigated due to technical problems with the study and a 
resulting sample size that was too small for discriminant analyses. Therefore, the 
discussion will focus separately on Hypotheses 1 through 3 and report exploratory 
findings. 
Interpretation of Hypothesis I 
In the first hypothesis, unrehearsed malingerers were predicted to display longer 
response times than rehearsed malingerers, who in turn, would display longer response 
times than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their psychological or physical 
symptoms. This hypothesis was partially supported because response times for half of the 
scenarios were significantly longer for malingerers than truth-tellers. However, no 
significant differences were found between rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers. Due 
to the design of this study, truth-tellers may have had similar cognitive schemata during 
the scenarios because they had to pretend to be truth-tellers. Walczyk and colleagues 
(2005) stated that individuals with well-integrated schemata in their memory are able to 
respond faster. In other words, actual truth-tellers who store factual information in their 
episodic memory can retrieve this knowledge faster than individuals who have to make 
up information. 
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The results from the response data only partially confirmed previous research 
which found that deception increases cognitive demands, in other words, create a greater 
cognitive load, which can be measured by analyzing response times and eye data 
(Vendemia Buzan & Simon-Dade, 2005; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; Walczyk, et 
al., 2005; Zuckermann, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). However, the findings did not 
confirm that rehearsal has a significant impact on response time. Response times for 
rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers did not differ significantly. This finding 
contradicts previous research in which practicing a deceptive response was found to 
significantly decrease response time (DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009). 
Interpretation of Hypothesis 2 
In the second hypothesis, it was predicted unrehearsed malingerers would have 
fewer eye movements when answering questions than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, 
would display fewer eye movements than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their 
psychological or physical symptoms. Eye movements also described as eye gaze 
indicates the level of cognitive load. Individuals who place large demands on their 
cognitive functioning display fewer eye movements than individuals with smaller 
cognitive loads (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; Glenberg, Schroeder & Robertson, 1998). 
Eye movements were examined in the current study by two different measures: 
horizontal and vertical movements. None of the eye movement data supported 
Hypotheses Two. There was no significant difference between the malingering 
conditions. Therefore, eye movement did not provide a cue for detecting malingering nor 
did it differentiate between rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers. 
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The eye movement data contradicted previous research findings 
(Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; Glenberg, Schroeder & Robertson, 1998). However, 
previous research also suggests that an intentional change in eye gaze or eye movements 
may result in the opposite effect. Ekman & Friesen (1969) reported that liars are 
frequently aware of their eye contact being observed, and they may intentionally change 
their eye movements in order to avoid direct eye contact. In the current study, all 
malingering groups were instructed to answer in a believable way which might have 
encouraged them to change their eye movements. Compared to the other cognitive data, 
eye movement seems to be the one set of cues that is easily manipulated by individuals, 
whereas response time and pupil dilation take place on a less voluntary basis. 
As mentioned previously, the research design created pretend situations for all 
malingering groups. Essentially, the truth-tellers also were faced with additional 
cognitive loads because they had to accurately remember their truthful situation. Overall, 
the eye movement data did not provide reliable differentiation between all three 
conditions. 
Interpretation of Hypothesis 3 
In Hypothesis 3, unrehearsed malingerers were predicted to have greater pupil 
dilations, as measured by an eye tracker than rehearsed malingerers, who in turn, would 
display greater pupil dilations than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their 
psychological and physical symptoms. An increase in cognitive load is reflected in an 
increase in pupil dilation (Beatty, 1982; Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Granholm, 
Asarnow, Sarkin & Dykes, 1996; Van Gerven, Paas, Van Merrienboer & Schmidt, 2004). 
Therefore, truth-tellers who are assumed to have the smallest cognitive load would have 
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less pupil dilation than rehearsed malingerers who in turn would have less pupil dilation 
than unrehearsed malingerers. As with the eye movement data, however, pupil dilation 
did not provide significant differentiation between the malingering conditions. Again, this 
may be due to the fact that all of the malingering groups had a similar level of cognitive 
load due to having to learn and remember their roles and situational contexts. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the findings of the current study. 
Interpretation of the Exploratory Data 
Although not hypothesized, other factors were analyzed for significance across 
malingering conditions. First, inconsistencies were summed up across the scenarios in 
order to determine significant differences among the three malingering conditions. 
Previous research has indicated that inconsistencies are significantly more prevalent in 
situations that increase cognitive load (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij el al, 2000). Therefore, 
truth-tellers should have had significantly fewer inconsistencies than rehearsed 
malingerers, who in turn, should have had significantly fewer inconsistencies than 
unrehearsed malingerers. It was interesting to note that truth-tellers had significantly 
more inconsistencies than unrehearsed and rehearsed malingerings. This may be due to 
truth-tellers being actually in a pretend situation and having difficulty remembering their 
"pretend" truth. The other two conditions were not significantly different from each 
other, and this finding failed to support previous research. 
Second, instances of fillers were summed up across malingering conditions. These 
nonresponsive utterances were counted only when preceding the actual answer, which 
would have prolonged the response time. No significant differences were found for filler 
across the malingering conditions. 
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Third, questions were divided into yes/no or open-ended types and separately 
analyzed. Whereas yes/no questions entail recognition memory and provide participants 
with information which they can either deny or confirm, open-ended questions involve 
cued recall and provide opportunities for a variety of different responses. Open-ended 
questions place larger demands on cognitive functioning, thereby increasing an 
individual's cognitive load (Anderson, 2000; DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009). 
Due to the differences in cognitive load for each question type, the data were analyzed 
separately. Although open-ended questions seemed to create higher cognitive loads as 
evidenced by findings from the response time analysis (significantly longer response 
times for all four scenarios) and this is partially confirmed by the analyzed pupil dilation 
(more pupil dilation for half of the scenarios, whereas the other half showed no difference 
between question type), the eye movement data provided mixed findings. During the 
doctor scenario especially, participants showed significantly greater vertical eye 
movements for yes/no questions, whereas their eye movements for the other scenarios 
was increased for open-ended questions. This contradicts the assumption that open-ended 
questions elicit a higher cognitive load. Possible explanations include the idea that it was 
more difficult to answer yes/no questions. For example, during the instructor scenario, 
one of the yes/no questions is "Did you miss the test for a good reason?" This question 
might have elicited additional cognitive demands. Although participants are aware of 
why they missed the test, they may not be ready to classify their reason as good. Another 
explanation could be that three of the four scenarios start with yes/no answers and 
participants may experience initial problems assuming their malingering role. 
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Implications 
Human manipulation in the form of malingering has complex sources and 
motivations, and has resulted in a waste of financial and human resources. Due to 
problems with inaccurate identification of malingering, society continues to be burdened 
by individuals who make false claims or exaggerate existing physical or psychological 
problems (Mischoulon, 1999; Pollack & Graney, 1984; Singh et al., 2007). One way of 
attempting to more accurately expose malingering is the exploration of more objective, 
factual data that rely less on clinical experience and judgment than do the traditional 
methods of detection. In particular, cognitive research has focused on the differences in 
brain functioning when faced with the decision to tell the truth or to deceive (Baker, Stern 
& Goldstein, 1990; Gombos, 2006; Phan et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2001; Vrji et al., 
2006; Walczyk et al., 2003, Walczyk et al., 2005., Walczyk et al., 2009; Zuckerman et 
al., 1981). Response times, eye movements, and pupil dilation have been measured for 
differentiating between liars and truth-tellers (Beatty & Lucerno-Wagoner, 2000; Van 
Gerven et al., 2000; Walczyk et al., 2003, Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al., 2009,; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981). Furthermore, the differences between response types (yes/no or 
open-ended) and their impact on cognitive data have been explained in previous research 
(Anderson, 2000; DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009). Other studies have 
identified the impact of rehearsing on deceptive responses (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Walczyk et al., 2009). 
Findings from the current study suggest that response times differ between 
individuals who are asked to tell the truth and individuals who are asked to malinger, and 
a significant difference was noted between these two conditions and the rehearsal of 
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malingering conditions. None of the eye data was able to significantly differentiate 
between the malingering conditions. 
Additional measurements that were not part of the hypotheses, and which are 
useful for exploratory analysis only, also provided important information. Questions had 
been divided into triggering yes/no and open-ended responses. The findings indicate that 
cognitive load increases with open-ended questions during the majority of the scenarios. 
Response time measures confirmed these assumptions. However, the eye movement data 
provided mixed results. Pupil dilation data only partially confirmed the assumption of 
cognitive load increasing when a more elaborate response is demanded. 
Additional exploratory analysis focused on measuring differences in filler and 
inconsistencies by malingering condition. Whereas the analysis of filler did not provide 
significant results, inconsistencies were found to be more prevalent for truth-tellers than 
for any of the other malingering groups. This may be due to the design of the study. All 
malingering conditions are essentially based on pretense, even in the truth-telling group. 
Therefore, having more instances of filler may indicate the difficulties individuals had in 
remembering the truthful event as previously instructed. Malingerers may feel more 
freedom to elaborate in order to make up information according to their malingering 
condition, and they may have fewer restrictions that trigger inconsistencies. 
Limitations 
The current study had a number of limitations that may have influenced its results. 
One of the limitations was the participant sample. As frequently experienced in research 
within university settings, the sample consisted of a fairly homogeneous group of college 
students. Although ranging in age from 18 to 60 years, the average age for this sample 
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was 21 years. The majority of the sample was female (70%) and Caucasian-American 
(75%). Another limitation with college samples is that their educational level is typically 
above the average education of the general population. Therefore, any generalization of 
the results must be done with caution. 
Another limitation of this research was the actual research design. Although the 
experimental conditions were divided into truth-tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and 
unrehearsed malingerers, all treatment conditions entailed pretending. In particular, 
truth-tellers were not actually responding with an actual truthful response because it was 
only the truth they were instructed to remember. The additional demand of searching 
memory for the pretend information for each scenario does not reflect the actual 
cognitive load of individuals who have to search their memory for factual information 
based on their own episodic memory. 
Furthermore, the technical aspects of this study may have impacted the results. 
Although, Audacity provides various advantages for digitally recording, replaying, and 
analyzing auditory data, its indiscriminant recordings and registering of random sounds 
may have contributed to inaccurate measurement of the data. Various background noises, 
such as moving chairs, opening doors, and coughing were registered as sounds and 
manual analysis of the data was necessary in order to determine the actual response 
times. Due to background noises, the graphic display of data was inaccurate for recording 
the actual end of the question as a beginning point for the response time. Some of the 
participants also had filler or premature peeps from the software, such as registering a 
cough as the answer. Therefore, manual analysis of the recordings and calculations of 
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response times was necessary. Due to the nature of human imprecision and differences in 
auditory awareness for sounds, the measured response times might lack precision. 
Another limitation of this study is that it had several technical errors that impacted 
the data. During the initial part of the study, problems with recording eye data resulted in 
18 cases not having any eye data recorded. Other technical problems included questions 
that occasionally were omitted resulting in missing data and instructions that were read in 
the wrong order during several cases. During those instances, the experimenter had to 
redirect participants to the actual instructions for each scenario. 
Another problem in the experiment was the impact of noise disturbances during 
the study. Not having a soundproof laboratory created various distracting background 
noises that may have influenced participants' responses and made it difficult to filter out 
the actual responses during the manual transcription and analysis of response times. 
Future Research Suggestions 
The current experiment analyzed various cognitive cues in order to increase 
effectiveness and accuracy for the detection of malingering. However, due to the lack of 
an authentic malingering context in which participants were told to actually tell the truth 
or malinger, further research may benefit from creating more realistic contexts for 
studying malingering. For example, healthy participants could be asked to tell the truth 
about their intact health with comparison groups of participants who are instructed to 
make up convincing symptoms of non-existing illnesses without the context of pre-
imposed scenarios. This would eliminate the impact of having to search their memory for 
information about pretend contexts. Although this does not provide for monitoring 
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consistent with the experimental condition, the outcome data may provide significant 
findings. 
Another research suggestion is to use participants from populations which 
represent the general population. University research samples provide various limitations 
in order to generalize research findings to the general population. Having a more 
heterogeneous sample that is more representative of the U.S. population may change the 
outcomes of studies of malingering. 
The rehearsed and unrehearsed experimental groups were instructed to make up 
feasible responses about non-existing psychological or physical illnesses. Additional 
research suggestions are to instruct individuals with actual minor psychological and 
physical problems and instruct them to exaggerate. This may reflect the actual problem of 
malingering in which individuals suffer from a mild level of distress but report a higher 
level in order to gain certain advantages. They may not have to increase their cognitive 
load as much as individuals who have to come up with novel information which is not 
available in their memory. 
Another research suggestion is to monitor the technical aspects of cognitive 
studies. The previously discussed technical problems may have contributed to the 
inaccuracy of some data. Therefore, multiple measures of response sets in settings free 
from disturbances may increase the accuracy of malingering research. 
Another suggestion for future research is to sample individuals who admit to 
previous incidents of malingering, and to study their motivational factors, preparations 
for malingering, and concerns about appearing truthful. This may provide preventive 
measures and assist in decreasing instances of malingering. 
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SUBJECT: HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW 
DATE: June 2008 
Please submit this page signed by your Department Head or Dean when submitting a 
proposal to the Human Use Committee for expedited approval. Their signature is stating 
that they are aware of this proposal and/or survey that is being conducted. 
(print or type below) 
Department 
Psychology & Behavioral Sciences 
Department Head Name 
Tilman Sheets 
Signature Date 
(Actual original signature required) 
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Do you plan to publish this study? 
XYES D N O 
Will this study be published by a national organization? 
DYES X NO 
COMMENTS: 
STUDY/PROJECT INFORMATION FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE 
Describe your study/project in detail for the Human Subjects Committee. 
Please include the following information. 
TITLE: Detecting Malingering via Cognitive Cues to Deception 
PROJECT DIRECTOR(S): Birgit Smart, Jeffrey J. Walczyk, Mary-Ann 
Goodwyn, Tony Young 
EMAIL: bms013@latech.edu 
PHONE: 318-257-4315 
DEPARTMENT(S): Psychology and Behavioral Sciences 
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To test and refine cognitive cues to 
deception that may differ in individuals who malinger with or without rehearsal 
from truth tellers. The cognitive cues are eye gaze (focus), response time, and 
pupil dilation. Results of this study might contribute to the development of more 
reliable and precise indicators that inform about a person's veracity when 
incentives for malingering are present. 
PARTICIPANTS: About 90 undergraduate and graduate students of Louisiana 
Tech University 
PROCEDURE: Participants will be asked to participate in one experiment in 
which they will either malinger without rehearsal, malinger with rehearsal, or tell 
the truth. The experiment will involve imagined scenarios which are possible 
situations that can happen in students' lives. Students will be asked to adopt the 
role of each scenario and answer questions. Eye tracking technology will be used 
to assess eye movement data, such as pupil dilation and gaze. Response time 
will also be collected from each participant. Specifically, a camera mounted in 
front of each participant during individual testing will rapidly take pictures of 
his/her eyes. Recordings will allow researchers to assess what participants are 
looking at on a computer screen. Recordings will later be scored for retinal 
dilation, gaze aversion, and other indices thought to be correlated with the act of 
malingering. 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OR OTHER CHANGES by 
IRB Committee 
1. How and where will subjects be recruited? 
Subjects will be recruited from undergraduate and graduate psychology classes 
at Louisiana Tech University. 
What will they be told? 
They will be told that the goal of the study is to identify cognitive cues of 
deception that differ between truth tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and 
unrehearsed malingerers. The students will be told that their eye movements, 
such as gaze and dilation, and response time will be measured. NO 
DECEPTION WILL BE INVOLVED IN THIS EXPERIMENT REGARDING ITS 
PURPOSE OF SCOPE. 
Who will recruit? 
Recruiting will be conducted by Birgit Smart or Dr. Walczyk, that is, by one of the 
co-investigators of this project. 
Will there be alternative extra credit? 
Yes, the instructors in the classes where the option to participate will be 
announced will make extra credit assignments available to students who do not 
wish to participate in this experiment. The alternative activity will be designed by 
instructors and will consist of doing an educational task that will take an 
equivalent amount of time as participation in the experiment. 
2. You can see below that a declaration has been added to the procedure 
section of the Consent Form that questions may be asked about which 
students are not prone to be frank. 
3. Will anyone encounter potentially embarrassing scenarios? 
Yes, the experimenter who serves in the role of the lie detection examiner will 
hear answers to potentially embarrassing questions. He or she, however, will not 
know if the participant has been assigned to a condition in which answers given 
are truthful or deceptive. Moreover, all experimenters will be warned that all 
answers given are strictly for research purposes and should in no way be shared 
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with others or used to evaluate the participant at any time in the future. Of 
course, participants will be play acting, not disclosing personal truths. 
INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES TO INSURE PROTECTION OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY, ANONYMITY: The ISCAN camera eye trackers (please 
see attached) will be used to assess eye movements. Moreover, a 
microphone headset will be worn by participants to measure response latencies. 
Answers will be digitally recorded. Names will NOT be used in any of the 
analyses or publications that will result from this research. Specifically, subject 
numbers, rather than names, will be used to track and compile all participants' 
data. Only aggregated group data will be reported. 
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: There is a risk that participants will be 
made uncomfortable having to pretend to malinger because of their religious or 
moral beliefs. Moreover, they may be apprehensive that their answers will be 
used to evaluate them. With the consent of instructors, students not wishing to 
participate in research will be offered an alternative means of obtaining extra 
credit such as summarizing a journal article (see benefits and compensations 
below). 
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: Students will receive extra credit points from 
their instructors in exchange for participation. In addition, students will learn what 
it is like to participate in a psychological experiment. 
SAFEGUARDS OF PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING: To minimize 
the aforementioned risks, participants will be assured that they may withdrawal 
from research anytime and that their anonymity will be protected. If any students 
are made to feel uncomfortable, they will be referred to the Louisiana Tech 
University Counseling Services located in 310 Keeney Hall, phone: 318-257-
2488 or to Mary Livingston or Les Guice as specified on the informed consent 
form. 
Note: Use the Human Subjects Consent form to briefly summarize 
information about the study/project to participants and obtain their 
permission to participate. 
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Human Subjects Consent Form 
The following is a brief summary of the project in which you are asked to 
participate. Please read this information before signing the statement 
below. 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Response Time, Pupil Dilation, and Eye Movements: 
Cognitive and Physiological Cues to Deception 
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To extend, refine, and test further the 
Activation-Decision-Construction Model of Malingering and to develop further 
cognitive cues to deception, including response time, pupil dilation, and eye 
responses. Combined, these cues may eventually lead to a viable method for 
detecting malingering. 
PROCEDURE: Participants will be asked to be involved in one of a series of 
experiments in which they will either tell the truth to questions about physical or 
psychological issues, fake psychological or physical problems (malinger) without 
the opportunity to rehearse or malingering with time for rehearsing their 
response. SOME OF THE QUESTIONS MAY INVOLVE TOPICS ABOUT 
WHICH MANY UNDERGRADUATES ARE NOT PRONE TO BE FRANK. The 
experiments may involve imagined scenarios during which malingering (faking or 
exaggerating) psychological or physical problems might lead to beneficial 
outcomes in terms of getting away with something or having financial benefits. 
Eye tracking technology will be used to monitor and record eye movement data. 
Responses will be recorded for subsequent coding. 
INSTRUMENTS: ISCAN eye tracking technology will be used to assess eye 
movement data. 
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: There is a risk that you might be made 
uncomfortable having to malinger because of their religious or moral beliefs. 
Moreover, you might feel some embarrassment of questions to be asked. With 
the consent of instructors, students not wishing to participate in research will be 
offered an alternative means of obtaining extra credit such as summarizing a 
research article from a scholarly journal. 
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: You will receive extra credit points from 
instructors in exchange for participation. In addition, you will learn what it is like 
to participate in a psychological experiment, the methods used by psychologists, 
and so forth. 
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I, , attest with my signature that I have read and 
understood the following description of the study, 
" ", and its purposes and methods. I 
understand that my participation in this research is strictly voluntary and 
my participation or refusal to participate in this study will not affect my 
relationship with Louisiana Tech University or mv grades in any way. 
Further, I understand that I may withdraw at any time or refuse to answer 
any questions without penalty. Upon completion of the study, I understand 
that the results will be freely available to me upon request. I understand 
that the results of my survey will be confidential, accessible only to the 
principal investigators, myself, or a legally appointed representative. I 
have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any of my rights related to 
participating in this study. 
Signature of Participant or Guardian Date 
CONTACT INFORMATION: The principal experimenters listed below may 
be reached to 
answer questions about the research, subjects' rights, or related matters. 
Birgit Smart or Jeffrey J. Walczyk 
Phone: 318-257-4315 Phone: 318-257-3004 
Members of the Human Use Committee of Louisiana Tech University may 
also be contacted if a problem cannot be discussed with the 
experimenters: 
Dr. Les Guice (257-3056) 
Dr. Mary M. Livingston (257-2292 or 257-4315) 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Ms. Birgit Smart, Dr. Walczyk, Dr. Mary-Ann Goodwyn, and Dr. Tony Young 
FROM: Barbara Talbot, University Research 
SUBJECT: HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW 
DATE: September 16, 2008 
In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed 
study entitled: 
"Detecting Malingering Via Cognitive Cues to Deception" 
# HUC-596 
The proposed study's revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate 
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may 
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the 
privacy of the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a 
critical part of the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is 
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to 
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be 
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed 
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval 
of the involvement of human subjects as outlined. 
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on September 4, 2008 and 
this project will need to receive a continuation revieyv by the IRB if the project, including data 
analysis, continues beyond September 4, 2009. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that 
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects 
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information 
regarding this, contact the Office of University Research. 
You are requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and subjects 
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct of the study 
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion of the study. If changes occur 
in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if 
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of 
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be 
reviewed and approved. 





Please respond to the following demographic items by filling in the blanks or circling the 
most fitting response. 
1. Gender: Male Female 
2. Age: years, months 
3. Ethnicity/Race: African-American Caucasian-American 
Native-American Latina/Latino/Hispanic 
Asian-American Other (Please specify): 
4. Religion Atheist Jewish 
Buddhist Muslim 
Christian Hindi 
Other (please specify): 
1. What is your present student classification (year in school)? 
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Graduate Student 
Other (please specify) 
6. Current major (please specify) 
7. Marital Status Single Married 
8. What is your native language? 
9. What is your secondary language: 
APPENDIX C 
CODING FORMS WITH PAIRS 
OF INTERRELATED QUESTIONS 
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Questions for Scenario 1 
Assume that the questions are being asked by your doctor. Answer them as you 
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
o How are you feeling today? 
o Are you suffering from any type of pain? (Al )* 
o Do you currently experience any problems from the fall at work? 
o How does your back feel right now? (A2)* 
o Are you able to move around without pain and continue your work? 
o Do you need to stay at home for additional time to heal? (CI)* 
o Are you ready to return to work? (B1 )* 
o Do you think you would experience any pain if you were to go back to work right 
now? (B2)* 
o How much more time do you think you need in order to heal? (C2)* 
* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and 
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair. 
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Questions for Scenario 2 
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor in her office. 
Answer them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
o Did you miss the test for a good reason? Al * 
o What was your reason? A2* 
o Were you sick? B1 * 
o Why didn't you call me? 
o What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness? B2* 
o Where were you during the exam? C1 * 
o What were you doing? 
o Were you able to come to class on the day of the exam? C2* 
* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and 
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair. 
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Questions for Scenario 3 
Assume that the questions are asked by a disability examiner. Answer them as you 
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
o Are you suffering from depression at this time? Al * 
o Have you experienced any improvements in your mood lately? A2* 
o How is your energy level now? B1 * 
o Do you still have any problems with memory? 
o Are you easily fatigued? B2* 
o How is your concentration? 
o Do you think you can go back to work at this time? CI * 
o Does your depression currently make it difficult to perform your job? C2* 
o Do you feel that you are so sick that you still need disability payments? 
* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and 
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair. 
I l l 
Questions for Scenario 4 
Assume that the judge is asking the questions. 
o You were involved in a car accident. What suffering did you have from the 
accident? Al* 
o Did you receive any bodily injuries? B1 * 
o Did you feel any pain after the accident? A2* 
o What were your bodily injuries? B2* 
o Did you experience any psychological distress? 
o Do you believe that you should receive monetary damages beyond the costs of 
replacing your car? 
o Where have you felt pain? CI * 
o How does your neck feel since the accident? C2* 
o Do you have any problems moving your neck? 
* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and 
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair. 
APPENDIX D 
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Scenario 1 
Please adopt the role of a salesperson at a large department store who has 
been home on sick pay for the past two weeks after an accident at work. 
Specifically, you slipped and hurt your back slightly. It is really time for 
you to return to work because your injury has healed completely. You 
have experienced no problems in the past few days. You feel great and 
suffer from no type of physical pain. You have another appointment with 
your physician who will decide whether you should stay at home and use 
your sick time or go back to work. 
Questions for Scenario 1 
Assume that the questions are being asked by your doctor. Answer them as you 
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
o How are you feeling today? 
o Are you suffering from any type of pain? (Al)* 
o Do you currently experience any problems from the fall at work? 
o How does your back feel right now? (A2)* 
o Are you able to move around without pain and continue your work? 
o Do you need to stay at home for additional time to heal? (CI)* 
o Are you ready to return to work? (Bl)* 
o Do you think you would experience any pain if you were to go back to work right 
now? (B2)* 
o How much more time do you think you need in order to heal? (C2)* 
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Scenario 2 
You just missed a major test in your 8:00 AM English 102 Composition 
class because you overslept. Your professor, a tough-minded individual, 
will only excuse you for genuine illness. Otherwise you will get an "F" for 
the missed exam and most likely for the course. It is past the drop date. 
Your financial aid and your goal of a high GPA for graduation are at risk 
unless you are able to convince your professor that you can make up this 
test. You have an appointment in her office at 2:00 PM, hopefully to 
convince her to make up the exam. 
Questions for Scenario 2 
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor in her office. 
Answer them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
o Did you miss the test for a good reason? 
o What was your reason? 
o Were you sick? 
o Why didn't you call me? 
o What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness? 
o Where were you during the exam? 
o What were you doing? 
o Were you able to come to class on the day of the exam? 
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Scenario 3 
Approximately six months ago you suffered from severe depression which 
made it impossible for you to work in your dead-end job. Your depression 
made you feel weak, tired, and unable to enjoy anything at that time. You 
also had problems concentrating and remembering things. Your 
depression made it impossible for you to work so you slept all day long. 
Your work consists of standing on an assembly line in a chicken plant 
every day where you sort the chicken parts into bags of wings and drum 
sticks, a really boring and disgusting job. You decided to claim disability 
for a chronic depressive disorder at that time but have since fully 
recovered and are able to return to work. You have energy and enjoy life 
again. The appointment for your disability examination is scheduled today 
and you will be asked questions about your psychological condition. 
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Questions for Scenario 3 
Assume that the questions are asked by a disability examiner. Answer them as you 
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
o Are you suffering from depression at this time? 
o Have you experienced any improvements in your mood lately? 
o How is your energy level now? 
o Do you still have any problems with memory? 
o Are you easily fatigued? 
o How is your concentration? 
o Do you think you can go back to work at this time? 
o Does your depression currently make it difficult to perform your job? 
o Do you feel that you are so sick that you still need disability payments? 
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Scenario 4 
You drove your 1999 Toyota Corolla three weeks ago on campus when 
this big Mercedes came out from a side road in reckless disregard of your 
car and your right away. The car hit you, totaled your Corolla, but did not 
cause you any physical injuries. Immediately after the accident happened, 
the driver of the Mercedes jumped out, yelled at you for not stopping on 
time, and did not ask you if you were okay or if you needed help. Later, 
you overhead him talking to his wife on his cell phone saying that a 
"jackass college kid ran into me." He creates difficulties for you, 
requesting his insurance to check your role in the accident very carefully 
and not pay for your totaled car. You finally have a court date and the 
judge is going to ask you questions about your psychological and physical 
well-being resulting from the accident. 
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Questions for Scenario 4 
Assume that the judge is asking the questions. Answer them as you were instructed 
outside and as quickly as possible. 
o You were involved in a car accident. What suffering did you have from the 
accident? 
o Did you receive any bodily injuries? 
o Did you feel any pain after the accident? 
o What were your bodily injuries? 
o Did you experience any psychological distress? 
o Do you believe that you should receive monetary damages beyond the costs of 
replacing your car? 
o Where have you felt pain? 
o How does your neck feel since the accident? 




The purpose of this study is to test if individuals who make up deceptive statements 
according to the role they have been assigned in hypothetical scenarios display 
differences in pupil dilation, eye gaze, and response time when compared with 
individuals who are asked to respond with the truth according to the role they have 
been assigned in the same hypothetical scenarios. 
Previous research in lie detection has shown that individuals differ in response time 
depending on whether they tell the truth, rehearse their lies before answering, and 
lie without rehearsal. Furthermore focused eye gaze differs between these three 
categories. Pupil dilation also differs between individuals who are allowed to 
rehearse their lies, unrehearsed liars, and truth tellers. 
This study focuses in particular on measuring the above cognitive cues to deception 
within the context of malingering, e.g. faking bad. The purpose of this research is to 
explore ways for more accurate identification of individuals who malinger. 
As we have informed you before, your identity and response to questions will be 
kept private. Your answers were recorded under your participant number instead 
of your name or other identifiers in order to assure your confidentiality. Likewise, it 
is important that you do not reveal information concerning your participation in 
this experiment or other characteristics of the experiment itself because discussing 
this study with others could affect the data of other future participants. Revealing 
information about the experiment might result in inaccurate results and hurt the 
scientific value of the study. Your participation has not only allowed you to learn 
about the experimental procedure but also let you to increase your understanding of 
the psychological factors mentioned above that were tested in this study. Thank you 
for helping to advance the field of cognitive psychology. 
For any questions about your participation in this experiment, please contact one of 
the following researchers. 
Birgit Smart 
bmsO 13@latech.edu 
or Jeffrey J. Walczyk 
Woodard Hall, Room 114-E 
APPENDIX F 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR GREETERS 
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Instructions for Greeters for the Malingering Experiment 
Please proceed in the following order: 
1. Welcome the participant to the study and make sure that the person showing 
up has actually an appointment on the sign-up schedule. 
o If participants show up promptly, start testing right away. You do not have 
to wait until the scheduled time. 
o If participants do not show up on time, call their listed number right away 
reminding them that they are scheduled and see if they can come within 
the next 10 minutes. 
o DO NOT LEAVE OUT ANY PARTICIPANT NUMBERS AND 
ALWAYS GO IN THE ORDER OF THE SHEET. ASSIGN NUMBERS 
IN THE ORDER PARTICIPANTS ARE SHOWING UP FOR THE 
STUDY. 
o Example: Joe is unable to come for his 9:00 am appointment and he would 
have been Participant Number 10, Jane who shows up for her 9:30 am 
appointment will be Participant Number 10. 
2. Obtain informed consent for the experiment. 
o Provide participants with written informed consent and a pen and ask them 
if they have any questions. 
o If they agree to the conditions of the study and want to participate, let 
them sign the sign-in sheet. 
o Ask participants to fill out the sign in sheet. Remind them to print their 
names legibly in order for them to receive their extra credit. 
3. Check the sign-in sheet in order to determine what condition participant is in 
(right column, e.g., A, B, or C). 
o Administer the malingering condition instructions according to 
participant's assigned condition. 
o Example: if Joe is in condition A, look in the folder with "Condition A 
Procedure" and follow the instructions for greeters by providing the 
"Condition A Instructions for Participants" to the participant for reading 
along while you read your instructions verbatim. 
o After you and participants are finished with the reading, place the greeter 
and participant instructions back into their correct folder in order to avoid 
confusion. 
4. Escort the participant to the examiner in the eye-tracking laboratory. 
o Introduce each participant to the examiner by stating participant's number 
and experimental condition. 
o Example: "This is Joe, number 30, and he is in condition A." 
5. After the eye-tracking session, the examiner will escort participant back to 
you. 
o Have participants read the debOriefing statement and thank them for 
participating in this experiment. 
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Instructions for Examiners for the Malingering Experiment 
Please proceed in the following order: 
1. Make sure that you obtain participant number and experimental condition 
for each participant from the greeter. 
2. Administer the malingering instructions (spoken task) next. 
o Make sure that your malingering instruction (condition A, B, or C) matches 
the participant's assigned malingering condition. 
3. For this experiment, the audacity file recordings are needed. Audacity file 
names should be AUD800. AUD801, etc. Begin recording after the practice 
item. Pause except during questions. 
4. The computer will display the random order of the scenarios, e.g., 1,3,4,2. 
This provides you with the information you need in order to give correct 
handouts to the participants. Each scenario, including the practice one, is on 
a separate handout. Read each scenario aloud so the participant can follow 
along. Read slowly and clearly. 
o Example: Joe comes in, receives a handout for the practice scenario, undergoes 
calibration, receives the supplemental instructions, and answers the questions 
accordingly. Next handout the next scenario, review of scenario, chin on headrest, 
and answers, etc. 
o All scenarios have a number on the left hand top corner of the page. 
5. For hygienic purposes, place a fresh tissue on the chinrest before asking each 
participant to put their chin on the device. 
6. Calibrate the eye tracker. 
o Instruct each participant to remain as still as possible. 
o One of your main tasks is to keep the eye tracker calibrated throughout the 
session. 
o After running through the practice item, turn on the eye tracking recorder. 
o Save each participant's eye data file under EYE and participant's number. For 
example, participant number 800 is EYE800, etc. 
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o Put headphones on the participant's ears so that the attached microphone is 
close to the participant's mouth. 
o For the Malingering Experiment, the response time file will have the file name 
LIE and participant's number. For example, participant number 801 will be 
saved under LIE801, etc. 
o Run through the practice questions with the participants, reminding them to 
answer quickly. 
o After the practice items, begin recording data with the beginning of the actual 
malingering scenarios. Use the eye tracker by clicking on the appropriate key. 
Following the last question, end recording and use the eye tracker by clicking 
on the appropriate key. SAVE THE DATA BY NAMING SYSTEM NOTED 
ABOVE. 
7. Explain to participants that they are done with this part of the study and 
return them to the greeter. A debriefing statement will follow. 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION A 
See Handout for CONDITION A for instructions. 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION B 
See Handout for CONDITION B for instructions. 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION C 
See Handout for CONDITION C for instructions. 
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Condition A Procedure 
Instructions to be followed by the greeter: 
Hand a copy of these instructions to the participant so that he or she can follow along as 
you READ ALOUD slowly and clearly to the participant. Afterward, ask the participant 
to summarize the instructions in his or her own words. Verify his or her understanding. 
For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an 
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil 
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and 
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be 
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You 
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the 
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and 
prevent others from hearing the questions you are being asked. The 
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to 
truthfulness or deception. 
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt 
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While 
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at 
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene. 
Please answer all questions honestly, consistently, and as quickly as 
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" 
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or 
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all 
questions TRUTHFULLY according to the role you are asked to adopt 
and with nothing but the truth, speaking only the information necessary 
to answer the question. All information will be kept strictly confidential 
and anonymous. 
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do? 
{Offer corrective feedback or clarification as needed.) 
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Condition A Instructions for Participant 
For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an 
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil 
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and 
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be 
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You 
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the 
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and 
prevent others from hearing the questions you are being asked. The 
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to 
truthfulness or deception. 
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt 
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While 
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at 
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene. 
Please answer all questions honestly, consistently, and as quickly as 
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" 
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or 
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all 
questions TRUTHFULLY according to the role you are asked to adopt 
and with nothing but the truth, speaking only the information necessary 
to answer the question. All information will be kept strictly confidential 
and anonymous. 
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do? 
Condition B Procedure 
Instructions to be followed by the greeter: 
Hand a copy of these instructions to the participant so that he or she can follow along as 
you READ ALOUD slowly and clearly to the participant. Afterward, ask the participant 
to summarize the instructions in his or her own words. Verify his or her understanding. 
For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an 
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil 
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and 
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be 
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You 
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the 
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and 
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The 
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to 
truthfulness or deception. 
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios on you will adopt 
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While 
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at 
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene. 
Please answer all questions deceptively, consistently, and as quickly as 
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" 
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or 
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all 
questions ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the 
role you are asked to adopt. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE 
CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT THE LIES YOU 
PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER. All information 
will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. 
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do? 
{Offer corrective feedback or clarification as needed.) 
Condition B Instructions for Participant 
For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an 
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil 
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and 
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be 
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You 
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the 
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and 
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The 
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to 
truthfulness or deception. 
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios on you will adopt 
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While 
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at 
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene. 
Please answer all questions deceptively, consistently, and as quickly as 
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" 
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or 
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all 
questions ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the 
role you are asked to adopt. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE 
CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT THE LIES YOU 
PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER. All information 
will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. 
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do? 
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Condition C Procedure 
Instructions to be followed by the greeter: 
Hand a copy of these instructions to the participant so that he or she can follow along as 
you READ ALOUD slowly and clearly to the participant. Afterward, ask the participant 
to summarize the instructions in his or her own words. Verify his or her understanding. 
For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an 
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil 
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and 
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be 
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You 
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the 
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and 
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The 
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to 
truthfulness or deception. 
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt 
various roles. After each, a series of questions dealing with this scenario 
will be posed. While answering, keep your eyes focused on the 
landscape. You may look at any part of the landscape, but try not to 
look away from the scene. Please answer all questions deceptively, 
consistently, and as quickly as possible. Avoid throat clearing and 
irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" and "ah." Please remove any items 
from your mouth, such as gum or candy, before entering the room. As a 
final reminder, please answer all questions ANSWER ALL 
QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the role you are asked to adopt. 
IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE 
SURE THAT THE LIES YOU PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT 
ONE ANOTHER. All information will be kept strictly confidential and 
anonymous. 
Prior to testing, you will be given a copy of the questions so you can 
rehearse your lies before the questions are being asked. Try to prepare 
believable and consistent lies during rehearsal time. 
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do? 
(Offer corrective feedback or clarification as needed) 
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Condition C Instructions for Participant 
For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an 
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil 
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and 
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be 
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You 
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the 
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and 
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The 
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to 
truthfulness or deception. 
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt 
various roles. After each, a series of questions dealing with this scenario 
will be posed. While answering, keep your eyes focused on the 
landscape. You may look at any part of the landscape, but try not to 
look away from the scene. Please answer all questions deceptively, 
consistently, and as quickly as possible. Avoid throat clearing and 
irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" and "ah." Please remove any items 
from your mouth, such as gum or candy, before entering the room. As a 
final reminder, please answer all questions ANSWER ALL 
QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the role you are asked to adopt. 
IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE 
SURE THAT THE LIES YOU PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT 
ONE ANOTHER. All information will be kept strictly confidential and 
anonymous. 
Prior to testing, you will be given a copy of the questions so you can 
rehearse your lies before the questions are being asked. Try to prepare 
believable and consistent lies during rehearsal time. 
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do? 
APPENDIX H 
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SET OF INSTRUCTIONS 
A copy of the written instructions will be provided to participants as the greeter 
reads aloud. All participants will be asked to summarize instructions in their own words 
after hearing them. Misunderstandings will be corrected. After the participants have read 
along, they will be allowed to review the written scenarios until they indicate that they 
understand their roles. 
General Instructions 
"In the following experiment, please listen closely to each scenario and then 
respond to the following questions with a short answer or yes/no reply depending on what 
role you have been assigned. Please listen carefully to each scenario. Do you have any 
questions at this point? Are you ready to get started?" 
This first scenario is for practice purposes only but reflects the basic features of 
the longer experimental scenarios. 
Practice Scenario: 
Imagine that you did not want to get out of bed this morning, but you were 
scheduled to come to this experiment for extra credit for your Psychology 
102 class. Please pretend that you decided to stay at home and take the day 
off. Your instructor will question you at the beginning of your next class 
period, tomorrow, concerning why you blew off the experiment you 
signed up for. 
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition: 
"You know that you missed the experiment without a good reason (you did not 
want to get out of bed) but decide to tell your instructor the truth about not showing up 
for the experiment. Please answer the following questions truthfully." 
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You know that you do not have a good excuse for missing the experiment but 
would like to get the extra credit anyway. You figure that pretending that you were ill 
might make your instructor more sympathetic and you might receive the extra credit. 
Please answer the following questions by adopting the role (pretending) of having been 
too ill to go to the experiment." 
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You know that you do NOT have a good excuse for missing the experiment but would 
like to get the extra credit anyway. You figure that pretending that you were ill will make 
your instructor more sympathetic and you will receive the extra credit. Please answer the 
following questions by adopting the role of having been (pretending to be) too ill to go to 
the experiment." After the instructions, the participant will receive the following list of 
questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the scenario. 
Questions Asked in all Three Conditions: 
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor. Answer 
them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
1. What were you doing at the time you were scheduled for the experiment? 
2. Were you unable to come to the experiment? 
3. Were you sick at the time of your appointment for the experiment? 
4. If anything, what was your illness? 
5. Why didn't you call me? 
After successfully completing the practice scenario, the experimental scenarios will be 
presented. The order will be randomized. 
Scenario 1: 
Please adopt the role of a salesperson at a large department store who has 
been home on sick pay for the past two weeks after an accident at work. 
Specifically, you slipped and hurt your back slightly. It is really time for 
you to return to work because your injury has healed completely. You 
have experienced no problems in the past few days. You feel great and 
suffer from no type of physical pain. You have another appointment with 
your physician who will decide whether you should stay at home and use 
your sick time or go back to work. 
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition: 
"Please answer truthfully the following questions about your health condition. 
Recall that you are fine and ready to return to work." 
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You want to have additional time off by using the three weeks of sick time you 
have accumulated during your years of work. You will be given a list of the questions in 
a few minutes concerning your health condition. Lie about how you feel. Though you feel 
well, please make sure that you will provide convincing lies in order to meet your goal of 
getting extra sick time for staying at home. Pretend that your back still hurts and that you 
are unable to continue your work at this time." 
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Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You want to have additional time off by using the three weeks of sick time you 
have accumulated during your years of work. You will be given a list of the questions in 
a few minutes concerning your health condition. Lie about how you feel. Though you feel 
well, please make sure that you will provide convincing answers in order to meet your 
goal of getting extra sick time for staying at home. Pretend that your back still hurts and 
that you are unable to continue your work at this time." After the instructions, the 
participant will receive the following list of questions for two minutes in order to rehearse 
answers to the scenario. 
Questions to be Asked in all Three Conditions: 
Assume that the questions are being asked by your doctor. Answer them as you 
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
1. How are you feeling today? 
2. Are you suffering from any type of pain? 
3. Do you currently experience any problems from the fall at work? 
4. How does your back feel right now? 
5. Are you able to move around without pain and continue your work? 
6. Do you need to stay at home for additional time to heal? 
7. Are you ready to return to work? 
8. Do you think you would experience any pain if you were to go back to work right 
now? 
9. How much more time do you think you need in order to heal? 
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Scenario 2: 
You just missed a major test in your 8:00 AM English 102 Composition 
class because you overslept. Your professor, a tough-minded individual, 
will only excuse you for genuine illness. Otherwise you will get an "F" for 
the missed exam and most likely for the course. It is past the drop date. 
Your financial aid and your goal of a high GPA for graduation are at risk 
unless you are able to convince your professor that you can make up this 
test. You have an appointment in her office at 2:00 PM, hopefully to 
convince her to make up the exam. 
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition: 
"Please answer truthfully the following questions with the hope that being truthful 
will surprise the instructor into being sympathetic and lenient with you." 
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You need to come up with a compelling lie so that your instructor will let you 
retake the exam. Pretend that you were sick and were unable to take the exam but did not 
have time to see a doctor for an excuse. The questions you will be asked will concern 
your health condition. Be sure to answer with convincing lies in order to meet your goal 
of taking a make-up." 
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You need to come up with a compelling lie so that your instructor will let you 
retake the exam. Pretend that you were sick and unable to take the exam but did not have 
time to see a doctor for an excuse. The questions you will be asked will concern your 
health condition. Be sure that you will prepare convincing lies in order to meet your goal 
of taking a make-up." After the instructions, the participant will receive the following 
of questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the scenario. 
Questions to be Asked in all Three Conditions: 
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor in her 
office. Answer them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
1. Did you miss the test for a good reason? 
2. What was your reason? 
3. Were you sick? 
4. Why didn't you call me? 
5. What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness? 
6. Where were you during the exam? 
7. What were you doing? 
8. Were you able to come to class on the day of the exam? 
Scenario 3: 
Approximately six months you suffered from severe depression which 
made it impossible for you to work in your dead-end job. Your depression 
made you feel weak, tired, and unable to enjoy anything at that time. You 
also had problems concentrating and remembering things. Your 
depression made it impossible for you to work so you slept all day long. 
Your work consists of standing on an assembly line in a chicken plant 
every day where you sort the chicken parts into bags of wings and drum 
sticks, a really boring and disgusting job. You decided to claim disability 
for a chronic depressive disorder at that time but have since fully 
recovered and are able to return to work. You have energy and enjoy life 
again. The appointment for your disability examination is scheduled today 
and you will be asked questions about your psychological condition. 
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition: 
"Please answer truthfully the following questions about your psychological 
condition when the examiner asks you about your bout with depression." 
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"Although you are completely capable of returning to work you would like to take 
advantage of getting money for disability so you do not have to go back to your 
disgusting and boring job. In a few minutes, you will be asked questions from the 
disability examiner. Please lie about your health condition and pretend that you are still 
depressed so you get disability payments. Remember to be as convincing as possible in 
your lies." 
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"Although you are completely capable of returning to work you would like to take 
advantage of getting money for disability so you do not have to go back to your 
disgusting and boring job. In a few minutes you will be asked questions from the 
disability examiner. Please lie about your health condition and pretend that you are still 
depressed so you get disability payments. Remember to be as convincing as possible in 
your lies." After the instructions, the participant will receive the following list of 
questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the scenario. 
Questions to be Asked in all Three Conditions: 
Assume that the questions are asked by a disability examiner. Answer them 
you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible. 
1. Are you suffering from depression at this time? 
2. Have you experienced any improvements in your mood lately? 
3. How is your energy level now? 
4. Do you still have any problems with memory? 
5. Are you easily fatigued? 
6. How is your concentration? 
7. Do you think you can go back to work at this time? 
8. Does your depression currently make it difficult to perform your job? 
9. Do you feel that you are so sick that you still need disability payments? 
Scenario 4: 
You drove your 1999 Toyota Corolla three weeks ago on campus when 
this big Mercedes came out from a side road in reckless disregard of your 
car and your right away. The car hit you, totaled your Corolla, but did not 
cause you any physical injuries. Immediately after the accident happened, 
the driver of the Mercedes jumped out, yelled at you for not stopping on 
time, and did not ask you if you were okay or if you needed help. Later, 
you overhead him talking to his wife on his cell phone saying that a 
"jackass college kid ran into me." He creates difficulties for you, 
requesting his insurance to check your role in the accident very carefully 
and not pay for your totaled car. You finally have a court date and the 
judge is going to ask you questions about your psychological and physical 
well-being resulting from the accident. 
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition: 
"Recall that you suffered no physical or psychological injuries from the accident. 
Please answer truthfully the following questions about your physical and psychological 
condition when the judge asks you." 
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Conditions: 
"You are really angry at the arrogant Mercedes driver and would like to get some 
extra money (and getting a little payback) from the accident by pretending that you had a 
neck injury (whip-lash). You pretend further that you have problems moving your neck 
and feel pain during daily activities. Assume that the questions will be asked by the judge 
concerning any physical or psychological symptoms due to the accident. Please 
remember to be as convincing as possible in your lies in order for the judge to award you 
money for your fake pain and injury." 
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition: 
"You are really angry at the arrogant Mercedes driver and would like to get some 
extra money (and getting a little payback) from the accident by pretending that you had a 
neck injury (whip-lash). You pretend further that you have problems moving your neck 
and feel pain during daily activities. Assume that the questions will be asked by the judge 
concerning any physical or psychological symptoms due to the accident. Please 
remember to be as convincing as possible in your lies in order for the judge to award you 
money for your fake pain and injury." After the instructions, the participant will receive 
the following list of questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the 
scenario. 
Questions in all Three Conditions: 
Assume that the judge is asking the questions. 
1. You were involved in a car accident. What suffering did you have from the 
accident? 
2. Did you receive any bodily injuries? 
3. Did you feel any pain after the accident? 
4. What were your bodily injuries? 
5. Did you experience any psychological distress? 
6. Do you believe that you should receive monetary damages beyond the costs of 
replacing your car? 
7. Where have you felt pain? 
8. How does your neck feel since the accident? 
9. Do you have any problems moving your neck? 
